North Macedonia’s way to EU membership has become a Sisyphean task. Each time my country makes progress, it is dragged backwards again by historical baggage. This leads to a situation where our European dream risks becoming a geopolitical nightmare for the European Union, as alternatives like BRICS begin to fill the vacuum. The EU must act decisively or face an unravelling influence at the heart of the Balkans.
North Macedonia was the first of the Western Balkan countries to apply for EU membership in 2004. 2 decades later, with the separation of Albania and North Macedonia in the EU integration process, the country lags behind 3 another countries in the region: Serbia, Montenegro and now Albania. Although the European integration process usually means reforms, in the case of North Macedonia, the bilateral problems with its neighbours, first with Greece and now with Bulgaria, took precedence, prolonging the process for decades.
Some polls indicate that pro-EU sentiment in North Macedonia has dropped significantly, from nearly 70 per cent in 2019 to 56 in 2023. This follows the country’s constitutional name change from the Republic of Macedonia to the Republic of North Macedonia, ending a decade-long dispute with Greece, as a prerequisite for Euro-Atlantic integration.
While NATO membership proceeded swiftly, the promised EU accession was one more time stalled. France blocked the beginning of accession talks in 2019, citing the request for interior EU reforms before admitting fresh members. erstwhile France lifted its objections, Bulgaria imposed a veto, tying North Macedonia’s EU advancement to disputes over language and historical identity, which became formalized in the negotiation framework under the French proposal.
In the meantime, North Macedonia got a fresh nationalist government. This followed a landslide triumph reflecting dissatisfaction among voters with the erstwhile approach to the French agreement and negotiations with the EU and Bulgaria. The fresh government now calls for a delayed effect regarding any constitutional changes after joining the EU. This is due to a deficiency of guarantees from Sofia that further demands will not arise during the process.
Тhe constitutional changes were the main subject of discussion during a fresh meeting between European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and North Macedonia’s Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski. However, it remains unclear whether Brussels supports the thought of delayed constitutional amendments, as proposed by the Macedonian government.
In fact, the French proposal, presently in force, effectively makes North Macedonia’s EU accession process depend on Bulgaria’s approval, allowing for the anticipation for future vetoes and nationalism from the Bulgarian side. It has explicitly embedded the bilateral issues concerning identity, past and number rights, without reciprocity, into the formal EU negotiation framework. That has not happened in any another country before. Even if the country makes the essential constitutional changes, there are no guarantees another vetoes will not arise. This is especially actual given the fact that both countries have completely different views on the identity questions.
If the EU wants the region to decision forward, the formal accession process and reforms in the country must not be tied to resolving the dispute with Bulgaria. Changes in the framework; guarantees; or delayed implementation of the constitutional changes are all options to be discussed by Brussels, Skopje and Sofia. Bilateral disputes, as they stand now, should not derail the process or impact the broader accession agenda.
If the EU wants to keep the discussion on the table, it must put more force on both sides. However, repeating the usual rhetoric, be it straight from Brussels or through authoritative visits in Skopje and Sofia, might not be enough. affirmative reinforcement and incentives for backing projects of common interest in the region would be more successful.
As a last resort, if the current government in North Macedonia and the fresh government in Bulgaria stay firm on their positions on the dispute, the EU will request to measure how crucial this dispute is, as it could lead to a failure of influence in a key part of the region.
If the EU sides with Bulgarian demands, the message to North Macedonia will be clear: we are not welcome in the EU for the foreseeable future. However, if the EU prioritizes enlargement and interior reforms over bilateral disputes, there could be alternate mechanisms to apply force on Bulgaria too. This would guarantee that the broader goal of regional stableness and integration is not overshadowed by narrow disagreements.
The blocking of North Macedonia’s EU integration for the current reasons related to the country’s history, language and identity could go on forever. This result is clearly not in the EU’s interest. It would make a vacuum for another geopolitical actors, specified as Russia and China, or even a shift toward alliances not common for the region like BRICS. The EU has respective options that could form the process. Its leadership might subsequently find the European future of the region.
Bojan Lazarevski is simply a political scientist in global and intercultural studies based in North Macedonia. Bojan is besides a writing fellow with Young Voices Europe and an activist and researcher.
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