In 1 of the rounds of negotiations between the US and Russia at the end of March, Russian representatives raised the issue of the “Black Sea Initiative”. This was enacted and implemented in 2022 with the support of Turkey and the UN to let for the safe export of grain from Ukrainian Black Sea ports. However, after a year, the Russian government withdrew from the agreement. Now Russia wants to discuss beginning up Black Sea shipping and trade again, presumably to legalize the export of grain and another goods from the occupied Ukrainian territories. “This is simply a crime. We must constantly fight to prevent the legitimization of this phenomenon,” says Kateryna Yaresko of the Ukrainian organization Myrotvorets in an interview with Kateryna Pryshchepa.
KATERYNA PRYSHCHEPA: How does Russia export goods from the occupied territories of Ukraine?
KATERYNA YARESKO: There are various schemes employed. Ukrainian grain is exported through Crimean ports, which were closed to global trade even before the full-scale aggression in 2022, through the ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol, and through Russian ports. The countries that buy Ukrainian grain are changing. For example, in 2022 Turkey was receiving quite a few grain through this way but after a while it withdrew from this practice somewhat. We now evidence far less cases of Ukrainian grain stolen by Russia ending up in Turkey. After Turkey, crucial amounts of grain went on to Syria. But after the change of government in Syria, this besides changed. The Syrians have refused to buy this grain. At the moment, Egypt is the main recipient and the chief hub for grain from the occupied territories. We are convinced that Ukrainian grain is besides exported straight through Russian ports but it is very hard to trace. Grain from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories including Crimea, as well as the occupied parts of the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk and Luhansk regions, is exported in immense quantities. All these regions are known for their massive agricultural territories.
Given this systematic practice of exporting grain from the occupied territories, what impact might the possible easing of restrictions on Russian trade in the Black Sea, announced in Moscow and presumably considered by the US, have on Russia’s actions?
In my opinion, it is an effort by Russia to gain political advantage. They are utilizing this grain to rise their status, to increase their influence over the countries to which they export grain. For example, we have recorded grain shipments to Yemen, to ports controlled by the Houthis. However, it is hard for the Russians to implement this policy effectively, as there is mostly a negative global attitude towards specified practices. Ukrainian embassies in peculiar are very active trying to prevent attempts to export grain from the occupied territories to 3rd countries. For example, in 2022 the Russians tried to export grain to Lebanon, but they failed and the shipments were blocked. So the Russians are trying to normalize the practice of selling grain from the occupied Ukrainian territories by seeking approval to export this grain. They claim, for example, that there are restrictions on the export of Russian agricultural products. This is not true, there have never been specified restrictions. In my opinion, these statements are made in order to legitimize the stolen grain from the occupied Ukrainian territories. It is the task of Ukrainian negotiators to prevent this due to the fact that this practice is simply a crime. Much of this grain was grown on land belonging to farmers who were forced to leave the occupied territories. Under occupation, their elevators and agricultural machinery were taken distant from them. Their land was handed over to 3rd parties and is now cultivated by individual else. All this is simply a crime. We must constantly fight to prevent the legitimization of this phenomenon.
You mentioned that there are no restrictions on trade in Russian agricultural products via the Black Sea. Russia besides exports grain grown on its own territory via this route. Presumably it is comparatively easy to camouflage supplies in order to marketplace and sale grain from the occupied territories as being grown in Russia?
This happens all the time. In our investigations, we effort to trace the way taken by stolen Ukrainian grain. We have respective publications in which we prove the actual origin of the grain. In 1 investigation, we trace grain from Melitopol that was transported to the port of Sevastopol and loaded onto a ship there. erstwhile grain is exported straight through Russian ports, the appropriate paperwork is manufactured for this purpose. In the case of grain coming from the Zaporizhzhia region or another occupied Ukrainian territories, papers are issued stating that it originated from crops grown in Russia. The authors of 1 of the investigations discussed 2 separate sets of papers – 1 issued erstwhile the grain was loaded on the ship in Russia and the another erstwhile it was presented to the Turkish authorities upon arrival at the port there. This is why it is crucial to keep talking about this, so that global organizations and our partners are besides active in preventing this practice. Otherwise, the Russians will proceed to do this with impunity.
What methods do you usage to trace the origin and way of Ukrainian grain?
We usage nautical monitoring platforms specified as MarineTraffic to track vessel routes. Unfortunately, many of the vessels active disable their AIS (Automatic recognition Systems). In addition, “signal spoofing”, the practice of falsifying a digital signal to present false data about a vessel or its route, is utilized extensively in the Black Sea. This means that authoritative open sources are insufficient for tracking grain shipping routes. We so usage information from sources in the occupied territories, which we do not disclose.
Does this information come straight from those in the occupied territories?
These are various sources. We are helped by the shipping industry, but much of the information we usage is unofficial.
Does all the grain from the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia go for export? Or does any part of it go to Russia itself?
Russia has always produced and exported large quantities of its own grain. There is no request to store grain from the occupied Ukrainian territories.
When it comes to assessing export volumes, we measure them based on crop estimations in the occupied territories. It is common practice to usage data from the NASA Harvest programme. This programme annually analyses the world’s food resources based on images from space. According to their estimates, the volume of grain production in the occupied territories of Ukraine is around six to 8 million tonnes per year. We estimation that around 2 million tonnes of grain are exported annually through Crimean ports. The remainder has to go somewhere. We believe that it is exported abroad through Russian ports. This is rather hard to prove, but there have been cases where Ukrainian grain has been detected in these ports. We have besides documented on respective occasions how grain is transported from the occupied territories overland via Mariupol to Russia.
What are the main obstacles to the trade in stolen Ukrainian grain at present?
Significant restrictions consequence from the decisions of global coordination bodies. At the end of 2023, the global Maritime Organization (IMO) issued a resolution in connection with the Russian-Ukrainian war, in which it confirmed the closed position of Ukrainian ports. This means that trade through ports in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory is considered illegal. The IMO appealed to all participants in the shipping manufacture to respect this position.
However, the organization only controls the situation with respect to the closed Ukrainian ports. It cannot control or prevent the export of Ukrainian grain through Russian ports. If the grain has been transported overland to Rostov, Azov or another Russian ports, the IMO is not in a position to prevent this. On the another hand, if a ship enters a closed Ukrainian port, this creates grounds for sanctioning the carrier, as this is simply a violation of the Ukrainian state border. In specified cases, the Ministry of abroad Affairs of Ukraine turns to the government agencies of the countries under whose flags specified ships are sailing and the countries where the grain yet ends up. Sometimes this work of the Ministry of abroad Affairs of Ukraine yields results.
It can be inferred from statements by the US authorities that Washington plans to lift restrictions on the grain trade from the occupied Ukrainian territories. Will the easing of sanctions make it easier for Russians to trade through Russian ports?
I am certain that no 1 will lift the existing bans and restrictions. They have been introduced by global organizations. But the Russians, as I said, are utilizing various manipulations. For example, they will export grain from closed ports to those countries with which they have applicable agreements and where this grain is expected. Another part of the grain will be effectively camouflaged and sold as Russian.
What is the consequence to your investigations? Do you contact representatives of global organizations?
We had quite a few contact with journalists from the world’s biggest outlets who wrote extensively about this practice in 2022 and 2023. They were happy to usage our material. In contrast, we do not communicate straight with global organizations. There were instances erstwhile we met with a typical of the Turkish embassy in Kyiv in 2022, erstwhile Ankara was inactive actively receiving stolen grain. We presented our findings to him.
Does the pattern of grain exports from Ukraine to Turkey inactive work?
It practically no longer exists, although there are inactive Turkish companies active in these exports. However, this predominantly concerns the schemes where the grain is transported from Sevastopol to ports in the Caucasus and reloaded there onto another ships. We know that any Turkish companies are active in this practice. But compared to the situation immediately after the start of the full-scale invasion, erstwhile Ukrainian grain from the occupied territories flowed to Turkey in what was a wide stream, these are insignificant quantities. This flow has been virtually eliminated.
Was this due to decisions by the Turkish authorities or did global sanctions work?
The advanced publicity around this practice had a crucial impact on the Turkish authorities. A number of journalistic investigations regarding the ships and grain that were going to Turkey were published by the global media. This practice was taking its toll on Turkey’s reputation, so the authorities simply could not leave it at that. Furthermore, Turkey was actively active in establishing and implementing the grain corridor for Ukraine. It would look bad if the Turkish authorities simultaneously participated in the grain corridor together with the UN and turned a blind eye to receiving stolen Ukrainian grain. Besides, the launch of the grain corridor has simply filled Turkish ports. Ships carrying legitimate grain left the Danube ports and sailed to Turkey, where the grain was reloaded onto larger ships. All these factors combined have led Turkey to reduce the practice of accepting grain from the occupied Ukrainian territories.
Apart from grain, what another categories of goods are exported from Ukraine’s occupied territories through Black Sea ports?
This involves the produce of companies operating in Crimea, specified as Crimean Titan and Crimean Soda Plant, which is sent overland to Russian ports. A fewer years ago, we noted cases of these goods being exported straight from Crimea. 1 ship was even banned from sailing as a result. But with the beginning of the Crimean bridge, cargoes are going by land to ports in Russia. Coke and steel are inactive exported via Mariupol.
It is worth mentioning that ports in the occupied territories, even if they are operational, are degrading very rapidly. The amount of cargo that passes through them has fallen dramatically. Russians are not investing in port infrastructure and equipment. Ports do not have the resources, for example, to acquisition tugboats or repair cranes.
Can the material you have collected be utilized as evidence and presented in court if necessary? Or do government agencies gotta analyse and collect their own evidence themselves?
We have cooperated with the state prosecution services. We make our material available to law enforcement agencies upon request. In 1 case, the prosecutor’s office interviewed our investigative writer as a witness in the case. In the case of the materials we provide, the state authorities undertake investigations and collect additional information. For example, I know of a case in which the prosecutor’s office asked the MarineTraffic online platform to confirm that a screenshot in our materials had indeed originated from their platform.
Our investigations service to supply a basis for sanctions policies against Russia by Ukraine and another countries. For example, the US Office of abroad Assets Control (OFAC) added the ship ZAFAR (International Maritime Organization recognition number – 9720263) to the sanctions list due to the actions of its captains and the Russian owner’s company, who were transporting grain from Ukraine to Yemen. The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine cites our material regarding this ship in their War and Sanctions Project.
Kateryna Yaresko is simply a writer working as part of the investigative task SeaKrime at the Myrotvorets Center, as well as the head of the Department of Business Journalism and Digital Media at the Kharkiv S. Kuznets National University of Economics.
Kateryna Pryshchepa is simply a Ukrainian writer and a contributing editor with New east Europe.
Please support New east Europe's crowdfunding campaign. Donate by clicking on the button below.
