Визит Таска в Индию: новое открытие в отношениях страны с Центральной и Восточной Европой

On October 21st 2026, Donald Tusk arrived in fresh Delhi at the head of a delegation of nearly 1 100 companies. It was the first visit by a Polish prime minister to India since 2010, and its timing was no accident: 9 months earlier, Brussels and fresh Delhi concluded a free trade agreement labeled the “mother of all deals.” Negotiations began in 2007, stalled in 2013 over key economical issues, resumed in 2022 and were concluded on January 27th 2026. The agreement links 2 economies that together account for about a 4th of planet GDP. The European Commission expects EU exports of goods to India to double by 2032, with tariffs eliminated or reduced on 96.6 per cent; with restrictions on services relaxed and the car marketplace liberalized through a quota system. The process is not complete: Indian press reports point to a planned authoritative signing of the agreement in Brussels on December 16th, and entry into force in early 2027. These dates stay targets, since the European Parliament must inactive vote on its consent to the agreement.

The force that decided why a negotiation that had stalled for years abruptly succeeded came from the outside: tariff policy in Washington and export controls in Beijing forced both sides to reconsider their dependencies. India’s abroad minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, speaking in Warsaw in September 2026, described his country’s engagement with Europe as a strategy of “de-risking and diversifying.” The same logic applies to CEE, where governments are very delicate to supply-chain vulnerability and risks to security.

The economical data call for caution. Polish-Indian trade reached about 5.7 billion US dollars in 2024, which already makes Poland India’s largest trade and investment partner in the CEE, yet the figure is tiny beside India’s trade with Germany (17.03 billion US dollars in 2024) or France (18.05 billion US dollars in 2024). Hence, at least in the early stages, the direct effects for Poland will be limited. Tariff reductions do not make commercial relationships; they only lower the cost of strengthening them. first commercial pathways include Polish military drone sales to the Indian Army, while the electrical bus maker Solaris, with its joint venture with India’s JBM Auto, shows what specified partnerships could look like in the services sector.

India’s engagement with Europe has historically been oriented towards the west of the continent. This can be described as a neglect of CEE, despite Cold War-era ties between India and russian satellite countries. In the case of Poland, there were besides earlier points of reference, like erstwhile the Maharaja of Nawanagar provided a safe haven for thousands of Polish families during the Second planet War. There are signs of change: Prime Minister Tusk’s joint message pointed to the first meetings of the Indian and Visegrád abroad ministers. The agreement thus poses a question to the region: will they act together, or will Poland alone effort to claim the function of India’s “gateway to Europe”? The region would arguably be stronger if it acted together.

Tusk’s visit builds on the strategical partnership established in August 2024 during Narendra Modi’s journey to Warsaw, which produced a mix of concrete and symbolic results. The 2 sides set a mark to double bilateral trade by 2030. It presently stands at about 6 billion dollars. The 2 agreed to launch a dialog about their defence industry, and discussed cooperation in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum technologies, critical minerals and space. Tusk presented Poland as a gateway for Indian businesses seeking access to the wider European market, a pitch Warsaw has already made. The most symbolic result, however, afraid the G20. Tusk said that Modi had pledged to support Poland’s pursuit of a permanent place in the group. The joint message is more cautious, committing both sides to cooperate in the G20 tracks and workstreams in which Poland participates or may be invited to participate. In return, Poland reiterated its support for a permanent Indian seat on an expanded UN safety Council and for India’s candidature for a non-permanent seat for 2028–29. specified statements do not decide anything: no single associate controls G20 membership, and Tusk’s invitation to the 2027 summit in Manchester would not confirm it. But the motion carries weight. A large Asian democracy lending its voice to a middle-sized EU associate that holds no seat of its own, in a forum where Europe is represented by the EU and by Germany, France and Italy.

This links straight to a point made by Shashi Tharoor, a erstwhile UN Under-Secretary-General who chairs the Indian Parliament’s Committee on External Affairs and was a guest at the European Forum Alpbach. Tharoor is among the most prominent Indian advocates of closer ties with Europe, but his support comes with a condition: European governments should respect India’s strategical autonomy and avoid a patronising speech in diplomatic exchanges. At Alpbach he framed the point in terms of Europe’s own interest, arguing that “Europe wins erstwhile it collaborates with smaller and mediate powers.” The most natural reading concerns Europe’s partners abroad. possibly countries like India that are tired of being treated as recipients of advice. Yet the formG20ulation permits a second, interior reading, which Tharoor did not necessarily intend. “Smaller and middle” powers are not only found outside its borders, many are inside it. Poland is the EU’s sixth largest economy and, as the G20 shows it remains removed from the table where global decisions are made.

The EU, to be fair, gives specified states leverage they would not have alone: the India agreement was negotiated by the Commission on behalf of all twenty-seven members, beginning a marketplace that no CEE government could have opened by itself. But its header gains, specified as lower Indian tariffs on automotive sector, and agricultural products specified as olive oil and wine, will arguably benefit larger Western European producers, while the region’s strengths in services and industrial niches are little prominent. A Europe that wants to be credible as a partner of “smaller and middle” powers abroad would be more convincing if it took its own more seriously. India appears to have understood this: by engaging straight with Warsaw and the Visegrád format, and not only with Brussels, Paris and Berlin, Delhi is treating CEE as a partner in its own right. For a region that knows what it is to be treated as the periphery of a western-centred debate, this is simply a useful mention point.

The partnership has an apparent complication. India’s relation with Russia is simply a greater concern for CEE governments than for their Western European counterparts. Lately, European and Polish officials started to accept the fact that this is something they are incapable to change. Instead, they emphasize that Europe can be a “trusted alternative” for India in technology and defence. The Delhi talks showed the limits of this approach. The joint message was negotiated until the very last moment, and its language frames the war in Ukraine mainly through its repercussions for food and energy safety in the Global South, alternatively than placing work for the invasion and the harm caused by Russia in Ukraine. Warsaw’s own formulation was a comprehensive, just and lasting peace consistent with the UN Charter, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Tusk repeated his pragmatic position, first put to Modi in Warsaw in 2024, that India could play a constructive function in influencing the course of the war.

The EU–India agreement will not transform CEE economies overnight. Its importance lies elsewhere: it creates a framework in which states of the region can build ties with a rising power that is itself seeks alternatives to dependence on Washington, Beijing and Moscow. Tusk’s visit shows that Warsaw understands this, and Tharoor’s insistence on equality suggests what kind of relation Delhi will respond to. If Europe wins by collaborating with “smaller and mediate powers”, the credibility of that claim will be tested at home as much as abroad. Poland’s place at the G20 table is 1 place where it can be tested. Whether this chance is taken will depend on turning symbolic visits into contracts, on coordination among CEE states, and on managing disagreements over Russia; otherwise the region will stay a marketplace and a service base for the strategies of others. The signing in December and later implementation of the agreement in the early spring months of 2027, will be the first real test.

This material appeared in cooperation with Club Alpbach Poland – an organisation associating Polish scholarship holders of the European Forum Alpbach – a conference that has been a leading platform for discussion on the future of Europe since 1945.

Kalina Bulkowska is simply a investigator focused on the Asia-Pacific region, an global relations student, and a Club Alpbach Poland scholarship holder.

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