Between October 22nd and 24th, 2024, the heads of state and government of the BRICS met in the Russian city of Kazan to debate a fresh circular of the group’s expansion. It is expected that countries specified as Belarus, Algeria, and Venezuela, among others, will be invited to join the group initially formed by Brazil, China, India, and the Russian Federation. The BRICS countries have been increasingly seen as an opposition bloc to the transatlantic alliance of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Although many of its associate countries advocate rearranging global institutions to make them ‘more pluralistic,’ the group is besides perceived as consolidating Chinese hegemony over a increasing scope of states. The BRICS expansion movement, therefore, is seen with highly affirmative eyes by Beijing and Moscow, with the second committed to breaking its isolation after the imposition of severe sanctions in 2022. However, this movement to include fresh states is resisted by countries like Brazil, which fears that the excessive asymmetry of economical relations with China will dilute Brasília’s bargaining power in the group’s multilateral negotiations. This hesitation is applicable erstwhile analyzing realistic prospects for Belarus’s entry into the BRICS since the Belarusian government aims to enter the group as fast as possible. Will Brazil’s reluctance to accept fresh members in BRICS postpone Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s plans? The Brazilian position on Belarus is multifaceted, involving economical interests and political perceptions influenced by the past of both countries.
Unlike Brazilian relations with Russia, which will mark 200 years in 2028, the links with Belarus are comparatively recent, given that the country has been formally independent for a specified 33 years. After the collapse of the russian Union, Belarus and Brazil established diplomatic relations in 1992, but only in 2011 did the Lukashenka government establish an embassy in Brasilia. Since then, bilateral relations have developed, in theory, separately from Brazilian-Russian ones, with many cooperation protocols signed in the last 10 years in fields like technology and culture. Despite this, the Brazilian side inevitably perceives Belarus as an extension of its relations with the Russian Federation. Historically, Brazilian public opinion (but besides decision-makers) have small cognition about the political context that developed in the erstwhile russian republics after 1991 and tend to proceed viewing east Europe as a natural hub for exercising Russian influence. This communicative benefits from the post-colonial worldview in Brazil, which views relations with the West with suspicion and tends to validate the Russian communicative in the region. The trend was reinforced following the 2020 protests against president Lukashenka, who resorted to deepening relations with the Kremlin in order to save his regime, and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, in which Belarus played a crucial part.
In ideological terms, Vladimir Putin seduces both the Brazilian conservative right, which is spiritual and afraid with advancing socially progressive agendas, and the left, which is nostalgic for russian times, socialist utopia and remains profoundly anti-American. Historically, the current political class that governs Brazil is made up of people who were persecuted during the last military dictatorship in the country between 1964 and 1985. The Brazilian political class therefore, sees Washington’s support for establishing that government as a wound that has not yet healed. This is partially capitalized on by Russian propaganda in the country’s social media. The degree to which Lukashenka can take advantage of this context to improve relations with Brazil and lower the country’s opposition to Minsk’s entry into the group remains to be seen. Despite this cognitive aspect of the Brazilian perception, applicable economical issues must besides be considered in the relations between Brazil and Belarus.
The war has importantly impacted the relation between the 2 countries, peculiarly in the economical sphere. The structure of commercial relations between the 2 countries, which were heavy affected by the western sanctions on the Belarusian economy, has been a critical factor. Belarus, along with the Russian Federation, is 1 of the largest suppliers of agricultural fertilizers for Brazil’s booming agriculture sector. This South American country is on track to become the world’s largest food maker in the coming years, adding force to its request for fertilizers. Nearly 85 per cent of Brazil’s fertilizer request is met through imports, with 30 per cent of this supply coming from Russian and Belarusian industries. The issue of fertilizers has been central to defining Brazil’s relations with these 2 countries in the context of the war with Ukraine. During a proceeding in the Brazilian legislature in May 2022, the Brazilian ambassador in Minsk stated that his top precedence would be “finding ways to mitigate Brazilian difficulties in accessing the product.” Even the Brazilian president at the time, Jair Bolsonaro, made a controversial visit to Moscow just days before the invasion of Ukraine to discuss this substance with president Vladimir Putin.
Here, we can note another essential aspect of the Brazilian position: relations with Russia and Belarus transcend the polarized political scene in Brasília. say there are fundamental differences between the approach adopted by erstwhile president Bolsonaro and the current administration of Lula da Silva regarding different topics in global relations, especially Nicolas Maduro’s Venezuela. In that case, the same is not actual erstwhile discussing Russia and Belarus. Part of this apparent cohesion is the force that the agricultural lobby, which is very powerful in the Brazilian parliament and curious in importing fertilizers at reasonable prices, exerts on the national government to keep good relations with Putin and Lukashenka. However, this relation of dependence besides causes discomfort to Brazilian authorities.
In 2023, the trade flow between Brazil and Belarus totaled 378.8 million US dollars, a modest amount compared to Brazilian abroad trade which stands at 500 billion dollars. However, at the same time, it places Brazil as 1 of the 10 most crucial trading partners in the planet for Belarus’s tiny abroad trade. There are complaints in Brasília about the utmost imbalance of these relations. While Belarusian exports to Brazil stood at 372 million dollars last year, it imported value was only at 6.4 million dollars, resulting in a Belarusian surplus of 366 million dollars. Chemical fertilizers accounted for 96 per cent of this balance. Brazilian authorities have repeatedly called for a reactivation of home fertilizer production in this context. In 2023, the Brazilian government launched the National Fertilizer Plan (PNF), which predicts that the country’s dependence on imported products will fall by 50 per cent in the coming years. This fresh policy could neutralize Lukashenka’s top asset in his relation with Brazil.
The applicable effects of Belarus joining the BRICS could be significant. While the group does not have shared form of governance or a free trade area, from a financial point of view, Belarus would gain expanded access to the fresh improvement Bank (NDB), popularly known as the “BRICS Bank.” The institution, based in China and chaired by erstwhile Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, has billions of dollars in its coffers, which could partially alleviate the effects of sanctions on the Belarusian economy. Minsk would besides gain access to the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), a 100 billion dollar fund aimed at bailing out countries in the group with problems in their balance of payments. 1 of the most notable aspects of specified mechanisms is denominating its loans in local currency alternatively of quoting them in US dollars, which follows a logic of ‘de-dollarization’ increasingly cited by the group’s countries as a precedence to counteract the American economical influence. It could be good news for the Lukashenka regime, as it would mitigate the risks associated with a sharp change in exchange rates in Belarus.
From a Brazilian perspective, however, not only the already discussed issues of relations with Belarus and Russia must be analyzed, but besides the possible side effects of events in another regions of the world. Venezuela, which besides aspires to join the BRICS, is simply a good example. From the tensions caused by Nicolas Maduro’s government on the border with Guyana last year to the electoral process that culminated in the re-election of the Venezuelan leader in July – widely contested by global observers – relations between Caracas and Brasília are going through a continuous process of corrosion. The final straw was the refusal of the Lula administration to admit Maduro’s triumph officially. The same script applies to Nicaragua, governed by Daniel Ortega, which broke diplomatic relations with Brazil after repeated protests from Brasília over the human rights situation in the country. Nicaragua late applied to join BRICS as well. How Brazil will behave towards their entry into the group, whether it will block them, and how this would influence Belarus’ accession should besides be carefully analyzed at the summit in Kazan.
Whatever the lenses utilized to analyse the expansion of the BRICS group, it is apparent that this movement represents another sign that power continues its migration toward the East. Despite Brazil’s geographic location and close relation with the US and Western Europe, the country tries to participate in this process while maintaining its economical and political interests. Given the above and despite all challenges, Belarus does have the possible to join the BRICS, if not after the summit in Kazan, then in the not so distant future. specified an accomplishment would benefit Lukashenka’s government and further strengthen Russian influence over the country. Around 30 states have now applied to join the group, which would inevitably strengthen Chinese influence worldwide, as the country is liable for the largest share of the group’s economy and abroad trade. This imbalance worries countries like Brazil, but at the same time, there is small Brasília can do to counter Beijing’s objectives. Brazil, however, can average the group’s language in its final statements as the Brazilian government tries to balance its cultural and geographic proximity to the West and its ambition to become an independent global player. From a European perspective, there is simply a peculiar knowing of this paradox. In fresh days, the European Union has shown an different willingness to decision forward with negotiations with the South American bloc Mercosur – of which Brazil is the leading associate – to work towards the establishment of an association agreement. This decision is being seen by many as an effort to, at least, keep Brazil in a position closer to the West amid this process of increasing global division represented by the BRICS expansion. However, how the country will manage the different interests of these players remains to be observed.
Angelo Biazus Marin Kramer is simply a PhD Candidate in Political Sciences at the University of Wroclaw.
“We suport the Belarusian Awakening’24” is simply a task co-financed by Solidarity Fund PL within the framework of Polish improvement cooperation of the Ministry of abroad Affairs of the Republic of Poland in the amount of PLN 230,000.
This publication expresses the views of the author only and cannot be identified with the authoritative position of the Ministry of abroad Affairs of the Republic of Poland.
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