Why the West inactive misunderstands Belarus’s function in Russia’s war

Alaksandar Klacko recalls the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion without any romanticism. For him, the war began the minute he realized that missiles striking Ukrainian cities were being launched from the territory of his own country. shortly afterward, he joined the Belarusian volunteers of the Kalinouski Regiment fighting on Ukraine’s side. He was later wounded and now lives in Lithuania.

“We understood that we were defending not only Ukraine. We were defending the future of Belarus as well,” he says.

His communicative captures the contradiction that has shaped Belarus since February 2022. On 1 hand, Belarus became a crucial rear base for Russia’s invasion: Russian troops attacked Kyiv from its territory, Belarusian infrastructure supports Russian logistics, military equipment is repaired there, and Russian soldiers receive treatment in Belarusian hospitals. On the another hand, thousands of Belarusians volunteered to aid Ukrainian refugees, hundreds joined Ukrainian military units, and independent surveys consistently showed strong opposition to Belarus entering the war directly.

Yet this discrimination has mostly disappeared from western analysis.

Belarus is increasingly portrayed as small more than an extension of Russian abroad policy. This reflects an undeniable reality: the Lukashenka government has become profoundly integrated into Russia’s war effort and, under global law, Belarus is complicit in the aggression against Ukraine. But this has besides encouraged a broader presumption – that the interests of the regime, the Belarusian state and Belarusian society are fundamentally the same.

That presumption obscures 1 of the most crucial political dynamics inside Belarus. While the government has supported Russia’s invasion, Belarusian society has mostly rejected direct participation in the war. knowing this gap is essential not only for interpreting Lukashenka’s decisions but besides for reasoning about Belarus’s place in Europe’s future safety architecture.

Belarus being part of Russia’s war is just 1 part of the story

In fresh weeks, the question of Belarus’s function in the war has one more time come to the fore. After Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Russia was utilizing navigation and communication systems located on Belarusian territory to strike Ukraine, he publically demanded that Alyaksandr Lukashenka halt their operation, threatening to destruct the facilities otherwise. Although Zelenskyy later reported that the equipment had been turned off, the situation itself one more time returned Belarus to the headlines of global media and revived a acquainted question: could Minsk become a direct associate in the war?

Such questions have arisen regularly since February 2022. all time Russia increases military activity or large-scale exercises are held on Belarusian territory, western analysts again discuss the likelihood of a fresh offensive from the north of Ukraine. Belarus is perceived primarily as a possible Russian military springboard.

This framing is rather understandable. If 1 judges solely by the actions of the Belarusian state, Belarus has indeed become 1 of the most crucial elements of the Russian military campaign.

In January and February 2022, under the pretext of joint exercises, about 30,000 Russian servicemen were concentrated on Belarusian territory. It was from there that the advance on Kyiv began — the shortest invasion way on which the Russian command placed peculiar bets. Russian troops utilized Belarusian airfields in Machulishchi, Baranovichi, and Lida, as well as radar stations and transport infrastructure. According to Ukrainian monitoring, in the first months of the war alone, at least 631 missiles were launched from Belarusian territory at Ukrainian cities.

Cooperation was not limited to the first weeks of the invasion. Belarus transferred part of its equipment and ammunition from its stockpiles to Russia, provided enterprises for the repair of damaged equipment, provided railway routes for supplying Russian troops, and gradually turned into an crucial component of the Russian military rear. According to Ukrainian intelligence, present more than 5 100 Belarusian enterprises are in 1 way or another active in the production of products for the Russian military-industrial complex — from electronics and optics to the repair of weapons and the production of components.

Another symbol of this dependence was the deployment of Russian tactical atomic weapons. For the first time since the collapse of the russian Union, Belarus has one more time become a country on whose territory Russian atomic warheads are located. Joint exercises utilizing non-strategic atomic weapons only cemented this function in Moscow’s strategy of atomic blackmail.

If 1 looks only at these facts, the conclusion seems obvious.

Belarus is 1 of Russia’s key allies in this war.

“Belarus provides its territory, infrastructure, and resources to the Russian army. From the point of view of global law, this means complicity in aggression. There can be no 2 interpretations,” says the erstwhile Belarusian diplomat Pavel Slunkin.

But it is precisely here, in his opinion, that western analysis frequently takes a further step that is no longer so obvious.

Given the Belarusian regime’s participation in the war, the automatic conclusion is drawn that the interests of Moscow and Minsk completely coincide.

“This is the most common mistake,” says Slunkin. “Yes, Russia and Belarus are in the same military space. Yes, the regimes support each other. But this does not mean that their interests full coincide.”

This conclusion has not only academic significance.

Indeed, it straight affects how Europe assesses the risks of further escalation of the war.

If Belarus has completely lost its agency and all decisions in Minsk are made by the Kremlin, the apparent question arises: why, over 3 and a half years of war, has the Belarusian army never erstwhile crossed the Ukrainian border?

This question is especially applicable today, erstwhile the likelihood of Belarusian territory being utilized again is actively discussed in the expert community.

The answer is not that Alyaksandr Lukashenka abruptly turned out to be a more independent politician than is commonly believed.

According to Slunkin, the Belarusian leader acts primarily according to the logic of his own political survival.

“For Lukashenka, the current model is almost ideal. He provides Moscow with almost everything but the most costly resource — his own army. He maintains loyalty to the Kremlin but at the same time avoids a decision that could destabilize the situation inside the country.”

And the point here is not only Lukashenka’s political calculation. Moscow itself, according to Slunkin, is not peculiarly curious in changing the current expression of Minsk’s participation. erstwhile the question of sending Belarusian troops was being decided in 2022, the Kremlin was convinced that the operation would end rapidly and on its own — there was no request to share the future triumph with an ally. Since then, the calculation has changed, but the conclusion has remained the same: Russia does not request 15 to 20,000 unmotivated Belarusian soldiers against a Ukrainian army that has accumulated combat experience over 3 years of war unparalleled in Europe. A safe rear is far more valuable to Moscow: oil refineries that are not bombed, airfields and hospitals that operate without the threat of strikes, warehouses and logistics that simply function without failures. In addition, Belarus’s position remains an additional lever of force on the Baltic states and Poland. To exchange this quiet haven for a fistful of additional bayonets that would turn Belarus itself into a legitimate military mark for Ukraine would, from the Kremlin’s point of view, be simply pointless.

It is here that the difference between the government and society becomes noticeable.

Lukashenka did not refuse to participate in the war. He refused only the form of participation that could endanger the stableness of his own power.

And in order to realize why this hazard turned out to be so serious, it is essential to look beyond the government itself and at Belarusian society — the part of Belarus that has practically disappeared from western discussion about the war.

The government entered the war. Society did not

One condition that western deliberations about Belarus have almost completely left out is public opinion.

In authoritarian states, public opinion is frequently disregarded. erstwhile 1 individual makes all the key decisions, it seems logical to focus exclusively on his motives. However, in the case of Belarus, it is precisely societal attitudes that mostly explain why the country’s participation in the war turned out to be importantly more limited than many expected in the spring of 2022.

Independent sociological investigation consistently records the same trend: the majority of Belarusians do not support their country’s direct engagement in the war in Ukraine.

According to the latest Chatham home and Center of fresh Ideas surveys, only 14 per cent of respondents express direct support for the Russian invasion, while overall about a 3rd (27 per cent) approve or alternatively approve of Russia’s military actions. Even more telling is the attitude toward the possible sending of the Belarusian army to Ukraine: only 9 per cent of Belarusians believe that their army should take part in the war.

At first glance, this looks paradoxical. Belarusian society remains 1 of the most pro-Russian in Europe. As of November 2025, 44 per cent of Belarusians support a geopolitical union with Russia. For a crucial part of the population, it remains the main political and cultural partner. However, this sympathy almost does not convert into support for the war.

The Belarusian sociologist Daria Urban explains that it is here that many external observers make a fundamental mistake:

“In the West, there is frequently a simplified logic: if Belarusians have a affirmative attitude toward Russia and choose an alliance with it, then they must automatically support the Russian war as well. But this is not the case. The advanced figure of supporters of a union with the Russian Federation is mostly the consequence of people simply being left with no another choice. Under conditions of full isolation, Russia is perceived as the way of least resistance, as the only tangible reality, and not at all as a conscious ideological choice in favour of war.”

According to Urban, Belarusians’ attitude toward Russia and their attitude toward the war be in completely different planes:

“Society is not sociologically monolithic; different groups of people live in non-overlapping information and value planes. And the fact that a individual does not want their country to go to war does not mean automatic legitimization of Lukashenka. Belarusians are mentally not ready to enter this conflict. We have the popular expression “never again” embedded at the subconscious level, so people en masse will not go to fight.”

In her assessment, the fact lies somewhere in the middle. The average individual adapts to the strategy not out of love for it, but due to the deficiency of an alternative: Lukashenka himself besides does not want the direct participation of his army, but allows the government to participate in the war only to the degree that it does not require the mobilization of society. He presents this line as his own main accomplishment — supposedly he “preserved peace”.

“Most people perceive Russia as a close state, but at the same time categorically do not want Belarus to become a direct associate in hostilities. For people, these are completely different, unrelated questions.”

After the mass protests of 2020, Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s government found itself in a deep crisis of legitimacy. Russia’s full-scale invasion did not automatically reconstruct it. Rather, a fresh unspoken social compromise emerged: many were ready to tolerate continued authoritarian regulation only as long as Belarus was not straight drawn into the war.

This is precisely why Lukashenka found himself in a dual position: Moscow expects maximum support, but the decision to send the army would mean a head-on collision with the sentiments of his own society.

This does not mean that public opinion determines the policy of an authoritarian regime.

But it determines the price of political decisions.

This is precisely why, explains Pavel Slunkin, the refusal of direct army participation should not be perceived as an example of Minsk’s independent abroad policy.

“This was a decision not in the interests of Ukraine and not even in the interests of Europe. It was a decision in the interests of preserving power.”

As a result, a situation has arisen that fits poorly into the strategy acquainted to western analysis.

The Belarusian government has become a full associate in the Russian war machine.

Belarusian society has not.

It is this contradiction that explains much of what has happened in the country over the past 3 years: from the mass unwillingness to fight to the growth in popularity of the communicative that Lukashenka supposedly “preserved peace” for Belarus.

But if society differs so much from the regime, why does the West proceed to see Belarus as only 1 monolithic object?

Daria Urban explains the roots of this blindness through how the West in general constructs information about the region:

“We late conducted a survey of the media image of Belarus and discovered a terrible thing: Belarus has no clear image in the West. Its society is perceived as any kind of monolithic organism, a single whole. There is no articulated position; Belarus is written about infrequently. But I would advise western analysts and politicians to look at Belarusian society in detail, to realize what kind of society it truly is.”

Western analysis for 3 years has compressed the full country to the size of Lukashenka’s bunker due to the fact that it is simpler that way. It is simpler to impose blanket sanctions on a monolith than to deal with shades of grey. For a European raised in a prosperous state with the regulation of law, it is physically hard to imagine the fabric of life inside full fear. The volunteer Katsiaryna Shulhan views this gap between western perceptions and Belarusian reality even more harshly:

“I would like the West to yet understand: Belarus is simply a full-fledged dictatorship in the very centre of Europe. But to grasp this, 1 must truly realize what dictatorship means. erstwhile we tell Europeans that freedom of speech has been destroyed and people are being massively imprisoned, they nod, but measurement it by their own categories. They do not realize how bad everything is and how hard it is for Belarusians to live with it. People raised in a healthy society are simply incapable to descend to this level of understanding. For them, this is any kind of abstract abstraction — well, yes, lawlessness, well, yes, courts work by telephone call… It is the same with war: until it comes to your home, you are not able to full believe that it is possible. So it is with our dictatorship: what has become the regular norm of endurance for a Belarusian is for a European an extreme, unthinkable nightmare.”

This inability to “descend to the level of understanding” of Belarusian “unfreedom” leads to a reality in which even the legal image of the war in the West is replaced by poster slogans. The word “co-aggressor” turns into a synonym for a full associate in the war; “no protests in the streets” turns into “society agrees”; and a closed, repressive country in which even asking a sociologist a question is dangerous begins to be perceived as a country where everyone supposedly does not care.

Daria Urban sees in this a more specific, almost everyday mistake — related not to propaganda, but to the West’s own policy. The growth of sympathy for a union with Russia in fresh surveys, in her words, does not at all mean that Belarusians have en masse fallen in love with this union.

“If society gravitates toward a union with Russia, this does not mean that it supports this union,” she explains. “It is simply that Europe has closed itself off: visas, bank accounts, any legal ways to get to the West have become practically inaccessible for average Belarusians. And Russia is simply the way of least opposition erstwhile you have been left with no another road.”

Because Europe fences itself off from average Belarusians with blanket sanctions, strict visa restrictions, and closed borders, it becomes increasingly hard for people inside the country to realize what democracy truly is. It is impossible to sincerely adopt and love democratic values by studying them exclusively from abroad textbooks.

“To realize and accept democratic values, Belarusians vitally request to see a rule-of-law society with their own eyes, to travel and communicate,” she says. “Barriers from the EU only conserve the situation inside the dictatorship.”

The unseen Belarus

If 1 looks only at the state, the image seems simple. But shifting the focus from the government to society reveals contradictions that seldom appear in western analysis.

Since the beginning of the full-scale war, respective 100 Belarusian volunteers have fought on Ukraine’s side. The exact number is impossible to establish; many stay anonymous to defend relatives inactive surviving in Belarus. At the same time, researchers estimation that even more Belarusian citizens are fighting for Russia. This inconvenient fact cannot be ignored.

Belarusian society is divided. But the dividing line is not where it is frequently imagined abroad.

Aleksandr arrived in Ukraine only days after the invasion began.

“For me, this was the second slap in the face from the Lukashenka regime. The first was in 2020, erstwhile the elections were stolen. The second was erstwhile my land was utilized to attack a neighbouring country. This is my home. No 1 asked my permission.”

His decision was besides strategic.

“I understood: if Kyiv falls, then Ukraine will fall afterward. And if Ukraine falls, then for me as a Belarusian, the chance to see an independent Belarus will vanish for decades.”

For Aleksandr, the war has never been only about Ukraine. It is besides a conflict for Belarus’s future.

This is why he objects to the increasingly common description of Belarus simply as an aggressor. He does not dispute the legal work of the Belarusian state. What troubles him is that the people behind the state have disappeared from view.

Recalling a European safety conference, he says he urged participants not to make “a 3rd mistake”.

“Do not compose off Belarus entirely. Do not compose off the hundreds of thousands of Belarusians inside the country and in exile who consider the Lukashenka government illegitimate and are ready to defy Russian expansion. These people may 1 day turn out to be very important.”

In his view, the problem is deeper than politics.

“We know each another poorly. Ukrainians know Belarusians poorly. Lithuanians know Belarusians poorly. We live next to each other, but we realize almost nothing about each other. And erstwhile you do not realize your neighbour, you begin to draw erroneous conclusions.”

Katsiaryna Shulhan’s experience reflects another side of this invisible Belarus. In the first days of the invasion, she volunteered in Przemyśl, helping Ukrainian refugees with translation, accommodation and humanitarian aid.

“There wasn’t a single thought about who was to blame,” she recalls. “We needed to act in this situation, not figure out who was right.”

She never felt the request to publically explain that she opposed the war.

“The origin was more crucial than words,” she says.

Today she coordinates assistance for Belarusian volunteers who fought for Ukraine, connecting them with Ukrainian veterans’ organizations and helping them access psychological, legal and medical support. Through this work she has witnessed another reality that frequently escapes western attention: Belarusians who fought for the values Europe claims to defend frequently return to legal uncertainty, without veteran status, residence permits or organization support.

This gap between the government and society is besides reflected in public opinion. Despite years of repression and the demolition of independent political life, virtually all independent survey conducted since 2022 has found consistently low support for Belarus entering the war directly. Even many Belarusians with mostly affirmative attitudes toward Russia argue sending the Belarusian army into Ukraine.

According to the erstwhile diplomat Pavel Slunkin, this is precisely what western analysis frequently overlooks.

“When Belarus is viewed exclusively as an extension of Russia, Belarusian society itself disappears. And along with it vanish the opportunities to realize the constraints within which Lukashenka makes decisions.”

Belarus has undoubtedly become part of Russia’s war machine. But the society surviving inside the country continues to follow a different political logic.

The future of Belarus will not be determined only by Russian bases, missiles or military infrastructure. It will besides depend on the millions of Belarusians who will stay erstwhile the war ends.

If western governments proceed to treat Belarus as a political monolith, they hazard reinforcing the very result they fear. A society cut off from Europe and isolated by indiscriminate policies may gradually drift toward Russia not out of conviction, but due to the fact that no meaningful alternate remains. After Lukashenka, Europe could find itself facing precisely the Belarus it assumes already exists: a country full absorbed into Moscow’s political orbit, with fewer remaining ties to Europe.

This prison that looks clean from the outside

Alaksandar Klacko crossed the border in February 2022 to fight not only for Ukraine’s independence, but besides for Belarus’s future. At the same time, Katsiaryna Shulhan stood on the Polish side of that same war, helping Ukrainian refugees before she had time to explain her own country’s function in the conflict. Neither expected the West to announcement their choices. Yet it is precisely specified choices, alternatively than Lukashenka’s statements, that will form what remains of Belarus erstwhile the government in Minsk is yet gone.

Whether Europe listens to Aleksandr’s plea not to “write off Belarus entirely” and recognizes the work of people like Kateryna, who have spent years building connections between societies where authoritative diplomacy has failed, will influence not only Belarus’s future but besides Europe’s security. If the West continues to justice an full nation by the walls of its prison, seeing only the clean facade, it risks overlooking the people inactive surviving behind it. For now, time is working in the Kremlin’s favour. But there is inactive time to look beyond the walls, while there are inactive people left to engage with.

Viktar Baranau is simply a Belarusian political scientist, investigative journalist, and civilian society individual presently based in Poland. He specializes in east European geopolitics, regional security, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) methodologies.

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