VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: Regarding Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web – which saw Ukrainian drones destruct 34 per cent of Russia’s strategical bombers – what’s the magnitude we’re talking about here? What are the immediate and longer-term military implications for the course of the war?
MICK RYAN: I think 1 has to consider both its impact on this war and its implications for warfare more broadly.
In this peculiar conflict, Operation Spider Web clearly has a military impact by reducing—by what percentage, I’m not certain yet—the number of bombers available to Russia. We don’t know precisely how many were destroyed, but it will diminish the number of aircraft that can carry those long-range, precise missiles—the ones that are harder to intercept and carry larger warheads. So there’s military utility in what Ukrainians have done.
Ukrainians have a real art for identifying where the Russians have failed to learn and adapt rapidly enough
But possibly even more crucial is the intellectual impact—whether on the Russian Air Force or the Russian public. I don’t think it will change Putin’s mind. Very small can. If he were to lose the war, he’d be facing hundreds of thousands of angry soldiers coming home and people asking, “What was it all for?” So I don’t know that this will shift the trajectory of the war—because that would require changing Putin’s calculus, and I don’t think this has done that.
The another point I’d make is that the Ukrainians have a real art for identifying where the Russians have failed to learn and adapt rapidly enough. The Russian Air Force has seen multiple bases attacked, yet inactive hasn’t caught up. That created a gap, and the Ukrainians exploited it. In modern war, if you’re not adapting fast enough, your enemy is going to make you pay for it.
I think its top importance lies in another areas — peculiarly in how another military organizations might view their own ability to scope out and strike adversaries. During the Cold War, only superpowers could conduct these kinds of long-range attacks. Now, anyone can. The bar has been lowered—not just for state militaries, but besides for non-state actors. Drug cartels could do it, for example. That means that we all request to up our game erstwhile it comes to defending military bases and critical infrastructure. Democracies, I’d argue, are even more susceptible than Russia in this regard.
Would it be fair to say this was the most impactful drone assault in past to date? any even argue that this could mark a breaking point in favour of unmanned warfare over conventional tactics.
I’d say it’s surely 1 of the most audacious drone attacks we’ve always seen. It shows that surprise is inactive very much possible in war—contrary to what any people claim. But I wouldn’t call it a turning point. It’s more of an exclamation mark—on 3 and a half years of innovation, creativity, and evolution in how war is fought.
Drones are transforming warfare, no doubt. But I think most people who have been paying attention already came to that conclusion. What happened over the weekend just underscored it—loudly.
So for those who have been paying attention, it’s the continuation of an established trend. But for those who haven’t, or remained skeptical, has this attack opened a window into the future of war?
I think so. For those who’ve either ignored the lessons or have just been busy surviving their lives, this kind of attack is, as you said, a window—a wake-up call that things have changed, are changing, and will proceed to change.
You mentioned the intellectual impact. What kind of toll has this operation taken on Russia? Financial losses are being estimated anywhere between 2 billion and 7 billion US dollars. Then there’s the strategical time Ukraine has bought, the lives saved—military and civilian. Is there besides a symbolic aspect to it?
Absolutely. As I said, there’s a very crucial intellectual impact on the Russians—but it’s just as crucial for the Ukrainians.
We shouldn’t forget: as Ukraine was pulling off this audacious strike, Russia was conducting the biggest drone attack of the war against Ukraine. For Ukrainian civilians who endure these brutal, needless attacks night after night, to see their military strike back is encouraging. They want to know they can punch back.
It’s psychologically crucial in Europe, too. People there proceed to see that Ukraine is worth defending—and more than capable of defending itself with a modicum of support.
Other countries might begin developing independent long-range strike systems, especially if they share akin concerns about future US intelligence sharing under Trump
And you’d like to think it has a intellectual impact in Washington, D.C.—on those who, alternatively surprisingly, appear to be siding with Russia. They request to see that a Russian victory, which Putin keeps promising, is far from inevitable. The Ukrainians have agency, and they are worth defending.
And that Zelenskyy does, in fact, have any cards up his sleeve.
Zelenskyy has quite a few cards. 1 of the most crucial is the creativity and innovation of the Ukrainian people—military and civilian alike.
President Zelenskyy emphasized that the operation was planned “solely by Ukraine”. Does that mean there was no Western engagement at all? Or is that simply Kyiv’s authoritative line? What should we read into it?
When I was last in Ukraine, it was around the time the US intelligence cutoff happened—and that had a profound impact, peculiarly in places like Kursk. But, more importantly, it had a broader intellectual effect. The Ukrainians yet internalized just how susceptible they were without US targeting data for long-range strikes.
So they’ve been working hard to make alternate sources—because they don’t want people to be able to veto their strikes. And as bad as things were under the Biden administration, which took years to supply ATACMS, they believe things could get even worse under the current administration. They have good reason to think that.
So this was a critical step: developing greater independency in targeting and strike capabilities. But it besides sets a precedent—other countries might begin developing independent long-range strike systems, especially if they share akin concerns about future US intelligence sharing under Trump.
Bit of a Pandora’s box, isn’t it?
It absolutely is. It’s forced quite a few countries to ask tough questions—many of which we don’t yet have answers to. But quite a few countries are now de-risking their alliances with America by seeking alternate sources. European defence industries will become increasingly important, both for weapons and for intelligence.
Let’s talk about the US consequence to Spider Web. In president Trump’s fresh conversation with Putin, we didn’t see him pushing back on Putin’s stance that there will be a “hard response” to the attack. What do you make of that?
Past US presidents, whom we utilized to call leaders of the free world, would have condemned a dictator invading a democracy. They would have defended that democracy strongly. That’s not happening now. Trump fundamentally said, “Of course Putin’s going to attack Ukraine again,” without even a token condemnation. That’s got to be a first for an American president—and it sets a fresh low for how the US deals with fellow democracies.
And what about Putin’s pledged “reckoning”? He said there are no more red lines. What kind of consequence should we expect?
Well, you know Putin’s lying erstwhile his lips are moving. What’s the difference between his promised “reckoning” and a average night in Ukraine, erstwhile 300 to 400 drones are hitting cities? Between 2,000 and 4,000 drones strike Ukraine all month.
I don’t see a real difference in what Russia might do in response. He’ll just usage this as further justification for his continued attacks on civilians and infrastructure.
So you don’t think he’ll up his game—go to another level? any have even compared this event to Pearl Harbor. Is that a valid analogy?
How can he escalate further? Nothing he’s done has improved his chances of winning. The only weapon he hasn’t utilized is nuclear. And if you talk to Ukrainians, they’ll tell you: even if he does usage a nuke, it just means more of them die before they yet win.
I don’t see how he can escalate in a meaningful way, unless he chooses to mark another countries in Europe. He’s already throwing everything he has at Ukraine.
There was a good metaphor I heard recently: imagine if, 4 years after the US invaded Iraq, it only controlled 15 per cent of the country and had lost a million soldiers. Would we say the US was winning? No. And that’s the situation Russia’s in. Putin’s confident, but he is not winning. It’s hard to see what more he can do to improve his chances.
So you don’t think he’ll phase any bombastic, Hollywood-style show of force—some kind of tactical atomic strike to hammer a point home?
He could try. But I find it hard to imagine he’ll go nuclear. Any NATO red lines that be now would vanish overnight. Trump would be forced to act, and I think the American people and legislature would request a much greater consequence to support Ukraine.
He might effort larger bomber raids or air assaults, but that would just make him more susceptible to Ukrainian air defenses. His “reckoning” could backfire and turn into a major embarrassment. So he’ll gotta calibrate it very carefully.
I don’t anticipate a game-changing response, but I do anticipate something, and it will likely be brutal for Ukrainian civilians, unfortunately.
And finally, Has Operation Spider Web strengthened Ukraine’s position in the peace talk negotiations, or made peace an even more distant prospect?
Peace was already a distant possible long before this. Putin hasn’t changed his objectives—they’ve always been maximalist: subjugate Ukraine, erase its sovereignty. Spider Web simply reinforced Ukraine’s message: “We are free, and we intend to stay that way. We’re not surrendering.”
Mick Ryan is simply a retired major general in the Australian Army. A postgraduate of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced global Studies and the U.S. Marine Corps University Command and Staff College and School of Advanced Warfighting, he is simply a passionate advocate of professional education and lifelong learning. In January 2018, he assumed command of the Australian Defence College in Canberra.
Vazha Tavberidze is simply a Georgian writer working with RFE/RL’s Georgian Service.
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