Охота за миром: неудачные попытки посредничество в украинско-российском мире с 2022 по 2026 год

The unagreed Istanbul communiqué of 2022

The first gathering between Ukrainian and Russian delegations after the start of the full-scale invasion took place in Homyel, Belarus, on February 28th 2022. Subsequently, throughout March, negotiations were held in Istanbul, the capital of Turkey. No concrete results were achieved beyond attempts to organize humanitarian corridors.

Specific proposals and demands from both sides remained known for a long time only through accounts from delegation participants, rumours, and information from journalistic sources. It was only in June 2024 that the New York Times published full draft versions of the peace agreements developed in the spring of 2022. The papers cover versions from March 17th to April 15th 2022. According to the journalists, the authenticity of the papers was “confirmed by participants in the negotiations and another people close to them,” although neither Kyiv nor Moscow officially recognized them.

According to the documents, Kyiv was considering crucial concessions: the constitutional enshrinement of neutrality with a refusal to join NATO (while preserving the anticipation of EU accession), de facto reconciliation with the business of Crimea without legal recognition, and unilateral restrictions on the army without crucial disarmament.

The main stumbling block was the article on safety guarantees: the agreement envisioned guarantors (the United States, China, the United Kingdom, France and Russia) who would supply Ukraine with military assistance in the event of an attack. However, Moscow insisted on consensus-based decision-making among the guarantors, effectively retaining a veto right for itself, which undermined the full protection system. Moreover, the negotiations took place without representatives from the countries that were to supply safety guarantees. As a result, their consent inactive needs to be obtained.

The papers contained highlighted sections that were not agreed upon between the participants, and it was the discrepancies in these sections that proved critical. In addition to safety guarantees, the parties sharply diverged on the future of Ukraine’s armed forces. Kyiv proposed quantitative indicators for the maximum size that were close to the real capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as of early 2022. Moscow, in contrast, demanded draconian restrictions — 85,000 personnel, a simplification of nearly 85 per cent for any types of armaments, 342 tanks, and rocket scope limits to 40 kilometres. This would have meant the virtually complete disarmament of Ukraine.

The issue of withdrawing Russian troops from the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts remained unaddressed in the text, with mention to a non-existent annex containing a map. Putin later stated that the discussion afraid withdrawal only with guarantees of a land corridor to Crimea. besides unagreed by Kyiv were Russian demands that included: authoritative position for the Russian language on par with Ukrainian, legislative changes regarding “denazification”, the cancellation of all sanctions and legal claims since 2014, and restrictions on cooperation with the global Criminal Court.

Russian propaganda, and even any European politicians specified as Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, claim that the “Istanbul agreements” in the spring of 2022 were already “almost signed” and fell apart due to “external interference” (most frequently blaming then-UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson). However, an analysis of the available information on the content of the negotiations and the published papers shows that the parties were in fact very far from aligning their positions on critical points. Russia’s demands, which Ukraine did not accept — peculiarly in the areas of global safety guarantees and restrictions on military capabilities — effectively amounted to a de facto capitulation by Kyiv and the abandonment of its ability to defend itself.

There were vaguely worded provisions regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territories. If Ukraine had agreed to Moscow’s demands, then it would have lost any ability to influence subsequent political and military processes within its own borders and would have been left susceptible to the further establishment of de facto control by the Kremlin — whether through direct business or through the presentation of fresh demands in the future.

Putin’s “ultimatum” of 2024

On June 14th 2024, on the eve of the Peace Summit in Switzerland, Putin delivered a message he described as a “real peace proposal”. For the first time, he explicitly demanded that Ukraine full cede 4 oblasts: Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk and Luhansk. This would have included Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, cities that Russian forces had not even approached at that point; Kherson was liberated in 2022, while Zaporizhzhia has remained under Ukrainian control throughout.

Putin emphasized that the surrender of these territories was simply a “precondition” for beginning negotiations, during which “demilitarization and denazification” would be discussed. In addition to the territories, the Kremlin besides demanded: Ukraine’s refusal to join NATO, designation of the annexation of Crimea, and a neutral, non-aligned position for Kyiv. Putin claimed that “these parameters were agreed upon during the Istanbul negotiations.” In the event of a refusal, the Russian president threatened “continued bloodshed”.

Ukraine’s abroad ministry called these statements an effort to sabotage the Peace Summit, noting that “Russia is afraid of actual peace.” Zelenskyy described the demands as ultimatum-like and compared them to Nazi Germany’s policies before the Second planet War: first demanding parts of Czechoslovakia, then seizing Poland, and yet aiming to occupy all of Europe. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte even called the proposal “insane” and a sign of Putin’s panic.

In this ultimatum, Putin demanded not only Ukrainian territories but besides strategically vital areas from military and economical perspectives: defensive lines in the east Kramatorsk-Sloviansk agglomeration, Kherson with a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnipro, and industrial Zaporizhzhia with the Dnipro Hydroelectric Power Station. Fulfilling these demands would sharply undermine Ukraine’s defensive capabilities and, as with Russia’s demands in Istanbul, open the way to further occupation.

Putin’s statements in 2024 fit into the broader pattern of Kremlin propaganda tactics: “Agree to our conditions now, or things will get worse later.” In particular, Putin’s Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov, commenting on his boss’s words, stated that the situation in spring 2022 was better due to the fact that Russia was not officially demanding the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts at that time, and “the situation will be different going forward.”

Zelenskyy’s expression for peace

Ukraine’s peace plan, known as “Zelenskyy’s Formula”, was first presented at the G20 Summit in November 2022. The proposals frame the aggression against Ukraine and its consequences within a broader global context. For instance, the situation at the Zaporizhzhia atomic Power Plant is presented as an issue of global atomic safety, the export of Ukrainian grain as an essential component of food security, and the integrity of Ukraine’s energy strategy as an inseparable part of global energy security. Environmental protection in Ukraine and ecological safety are besides closely intertwined with the worldwide context.

At the same time, the plan addresses Ukraine’s core interests: the cessation of hostilities and the full withdrawal of Russian troops, the return of prisoners of war and deported persons, fair compensation for victims of aggression, and trials for the organizers and perpetrators of the aggression. Zelenskyy’s peace expression emphasizes the creation of a clear and reliable post-war global safety architecture, including safety guarantees for Ukraine and a definitive end to the war.

The Ukrainian peace expression has received authoritative support from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Turkey, India (with reservations), the European Union as a whole, and respective individual EU associate states. On February 23rd 2023, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution (ES-11/6) that incorporated key elements of Ukraine’s proposed “peace formula”, titled “Principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine”. It passed with strong backing (141 votes in favour), demonstrating broad global endorsement. The expression showcased Ukraine’s agency and commitment to peaceful negotiations on the global stage, importantly undermining Russian propaganda narratives that Ukraine does not want peace. The Russian leadership angrily rejected the Ukrainian initiative.

Subsequent summits in Copenhagen (June 2023), Jeddah (August 2023), and Switzerland (June 2024), focused on implementing Ukraine’s peace expression and mobilizing worldwide support for Kyiv. Participants at these meetings signed communiqués on atomic safety and prisoner exchanges between Ukraine and Russia, but these did not lead to any agreements or peacekeeping steps from Moscow.

Proposals from the Global South

In 2023 and 2024, a series of initiatives emerged reflecting the geopolitical ambitions of the alleged Global South. China, Brazil, Indonesia, and African states put forward various “plans” that were driven by a desire to enhance their influence on the planet stage, mitigate the negative economical impacts of the war on their own economies (such as rising grain and fertilizer prices), and position themselves as neutral mediators. However, these initiatives frequently overlooked Ukraine’s key demands, specified as the full withdrawal of Russian troops, rendering them ineffective and leading to Kyiv’s rejection.

On the first anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, China’s abroad ministry released its “peace plan”, consisting of 12 points. The initiative included recommendations for a ceasefire, respect for the sovereignty of all countries, the abandonment of a “Cold War mentality” (a critique of NATO expansion), the resumption of negotiations, humanitarian aid, the protection of atomic facilities, the facilitation of grain exports, the cessation of unilateral sanctions, and the stabilization of supply chains.

Ukraine’s leadership and western allies received the paper sceptically, criticizing its deficiency of concrete steps to end the war — specified as the withdrawal of Russian troops. Beijing offered no mechanisms to engage the parties in talks and made no effort to safe UN-level designation for the initiative. China’s motivation lay in positioning itself as a global peacemaker and rival to the United States, while indirectly supporting Russia to preserve its strategical partnership and economical ties, including energy trade. The plan served more as an informational tool to boost influence among Global South countries than as a genuine way to peace.

In early 2023, Brazil’s fresh administration under president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva began advocating for peace in Ukraine. It proposed forming a contact group or “peace club” that would include China, India and Indonesia to aid broker an agreement between Ukraine and Russia.

However, no applicable steps or roadmap for resolution were outlined. Lula refused to supply weapons to Kyiv, citing a commitment to neutrality, and even suggested that Ukraine might request to cede Crimea for peace. Brazil’s motivations included restoring its global influence as a leader of the Global South, alleviating the war’s economical fallout (rising food and fertilizer prices), and advancing Lula’s individual ambitions as a peacemaker.

African diplomats besides pursued peace in Ukraine, advancing ideas for negotiation formats involving non-western states. In June–July 2023, a delegation of leaders from 7 African countries (South Africa, Egypt, Senegal, Congo-Brazzaville, Comoros, Zambia and Uganda), led by South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, visited Kyiv and Moscow. They presented a ten-point plan that included the designation of both sides’ sovereignty, a ceasefire, humanitarian aid, the return of abducted children, and unimpeded exports of grain and fertilizers.

The mission was motivated by the war’s economical consequences for Africa: soaring food prices (with 15 African countries, including Eritrea, Egypt, Benin, Sudan, Djibouti and Tanzania importing over 50 per cent of their wheat from Ukraine and Russia), food insecurity, and aspirations for a greater global role. African leaders sought to apply moral force by highlighting the continent’s suffering. However, the plan did not require troop withdrawal and was rejected as insufficient. South Africa, as the mission’s leader, emphasized its equidistance from Kyiv and Moscow, though accusations of a pro-Russian tilt (e.g., joint military exercises with Russia) diminished its credibility.

Indonesia besides advanced a peacemaking initiative. In June 2023, Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto, speaking at the Shangri-La dialog in Singapore, proposed a plan that included an immediate ceasefire along current lines, the creation of a demilitarized region with troop withdrawals of 15 kilometres on each side, the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, and a UN-supervised referendum in “disputed territories”. Indonesia’s motivations included safeguarding global food safety (given its reliance on wheat imports from the region), positioning itself as a bridge for peace, and advancing Prabowo’s ambitions as a future national leader (he was elected president later that year). Ukraine rejected the plan, viewing it as legitimizing the business by entrenching front-line realities and outsourcing territorial decisions to a referendum under contested conditions.

The initiatives from 3rd countries in 2023–24 diversified approaches to resolution, engaging global stakeholders and highlighting economical dimensions (grain exports, sanctions relief). They signalled the Global South’s desire to amplify its voice in planet politics and minimize home losses from the war.

However, most plans remained abstract, failed to request Russian troop withdrawal, and were perceived as favouring Moscow, yet widening the gap between positions alternatively than bridging it. These efforts yielded no breakthroughs but illustrated an evolution from bilateral talks to multilateral dialogue, underscoring the request for stronger safety guarantees and coercive mechanisms to accomplish genuine peace.

Trump’s plans

With Donald Trump’s return to the presidency in January 2025, the peace track took on a fresh tone. In March 2025, the United States and Russia initiated direct talks in Saudi Arabia. On April 25th, Reuters published details of what became known as elements of the “Trump plan”, which included freezing the front lines for a ceasefire; US legal designation of Russia’s position in Crimea; de facto acceptance of another Russian territorial gains in Ukraine; a ban on Ukraine’s NATO membership; US management of the Zaporizhzhia atomic Power Plant; the return to Ukraine of certain districts in Kharkiv Oblast; the lifting of US sanctions on Russia; and the restoration of Ukrainian control over the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Dam in Kherson Oblast and the Kinburn Spit between the Black Sea and Dnipro-Buh Estuary.

Additional elements reportedly active a US-Ukraine agreement on critical minerals, with safety guarantees for Ukraine mostly delegated to Europe. Trump described Russia as having made a “quite crucial concession” by allegedly halting plans to seize the full country. Russia rejected even a 30-day ceasefire proposal.

In November 2025, the United States unveiled a fresh initiative: a “peace plan” developed jointly with Russia. It featured territorial freezing (Russia retaining Crimea and Donetsk Oblast); limits on the Ukrainian armed forces to around 600,000 personnel; permanent exclusion from NATO; sanctions relief for Russia; the usage of frozen Russian assets (approximately 200 billion US dollars, with half attributed to Russia) for Ukrainian reconstruction; the joint management of the Zaporizhzhia atomic Power Plant; and a full amnesty for war participants on both sides.

Moscow deemed the plan “insufficient” and distanced itself from authorship. European allies of Ukraine criticized it as pro-Russian, leading to revisions: a 19-point version increased the troop ceiling to 800,000, added reliable guarantees, and removed amnesty for crimes. By late December 2025, Ukraine’s 20-point counterproposal included demilitarized zones in the east and linked any ceasefire to the ratification of an agreement.

The Russian abroad Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Moscow had received no 20-point peace plan for Ukraine. During talks in Abu Dhabi, a prisoner exchange occurred, with 157 Ukrainians returning home. The next peace talks were besides held in Abu Dhabi in early March – again without any results so far.

Conclusions: The deadlocks of 2022 to 2026

Reviewing peace initiatives from 2022 to 2026 reveals not simply a chronicle of failures but a systemic trap in global diplomacy: each proposal, from the Istanbul communiqué to Trump’s plans, serves as a tool for power redistribution alternatively than a genuine end to the war. Russia’s demands evolved from veiled military restrictions in 2022 to overt ultimatums in 2024, not only entrenching territorial seizures but attempting to rewrite global order rules — turning Ukraine into a buffer region in an effort at hybrid warfare against the West. Global South initiatives, while adding multicultural nuance, frequently masked economical pragmatism, with “neutrality” concealing geopolitical manoeuvring.

Trump’s 2025 engagement introduced a commercial dimension — focusing on assets and minerals — highlighting an irony: peace becomes a commodity traded without the victims’ full consent. Absent a shift in Moscow’s aggressive policy or robust enforcement mechanisms, a actual resolution remains elusive.

Dr. Lesia Bidochko is simply a Policy Fellow at the European Policy Institute in Kyiv (EPIK), Assistant prof. of Political discipline at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine, and a Non-Resident investigator at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt-Oder, Germany.

Kostiantyn Zadyraka is an analyst at the Detector Media investigation Center in Ukraine.

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