Russia’s war against Ukraine has shattered the post-Cold War European safety order erstwhile and for all. It led the EU to abandon its erstwhile denial of geopolitical competition and adapt its abroad and safety policy to handle the most brutal usage of force in Europe since the Second planet War. EU representatives have described the improvement as a “geopolitical awakening”.
While Brussels has articulated a desire to become a geopolitical actor, it has historically exercised its influence through normative power, in which the EU’s common principles and values are promoted and spread through its global commitments. But the evolving global environment is very different to that immediately after the end of the Cold War. Then, the western model of liberal democracy had no viable rivals. Now, the leading autocratic powers of China and Russia are aggressively promoting their own rival political models, global norms and principles in their joint ambition to overturn the existing global order.
In a planet of increasing strategical competition, the EU needs to make its east policy fit for a geopolitical world. This means rethinking its neighbourhood policy in general and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in particular. The proposal advanced here is that the EU should consider the merits of replacing the now defunct EaP with a “Trans-Caspian Partnership”. specified a shift would make sense for a combination of political, economical and safety reasons.
Why the east Partnership has become obsolete
Following the “Big Bang” enlargement in 2004 and 2007, the EaP was launched in 2009 to build a deeper relation between the EU and the remaining non-member states in east Europe. As a policy instrument, the EaP set out to advance and intensify political association and deepen economical integration. This saw the EU mark Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, as well as the 3 South Caucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
At the time of its inception, the EaP offered a fresh kind of agreement for the EU’s immediate east neighbours. This represented the most concrete framework for dealing with non-members’ prospective integration since the decision in the Maastricht Agreement from 1991 to prosecute an enlargement to erstwhile communist countries in Central and east Europe. The EaP provided an chance for integration by adopting over two-thirds of the Union’s acquis communautaire for countries electing to sign Association Agreements (AA), as well as negociate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) with the EU.
Further east, the EU developed an entirely separate strategy for Central Asia to steer its relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The EU, thus, drew a hard line in the Caspian Sea, acknowledging the European aspirations of six countries in east Europe while approaching the Central Asian countries as more distant partners.
Since then, many things have changed. The EaP’s one-size-fits-all character did not stand the test of time. Only half of the countries – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – signed AAs and DCFTAs with the EU. The another 3 states embarked upon different paths in their relations with Brussels. Belarus turned into a Russian satellite state and suspended its participation in the EaP altogether in 2021. Armenia concluded its own custom-made Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the EU, while Azerbaijan is inactive negotiating its own distinct bilateral framework, which will be very different from the first AA. Thus, the generic approach envisaged in the EaP has given way to individualized relationships with differing degrees of association with EU norms and regulations.
No longer synonymous with AAs and DCFTAs, the EaP’s future relevance as a policy instrument was called into uncertainty even before the European Council’s decision in December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine and grant Georgia EU candidate status. The decision marked a fresh era for the EU’s east policy and only accentuated the diversity among the EaP countries.
Meanwhile, bilateral relations between the EU and the Central Asian states have shifted to a higher gear. An Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) between Kazakhstan and the EU entered into force in 2020. Kyrgyzstan has followed suit by signing an EPCA in June 2024 and Uzbekistan is next in line. These Central Asian states’ agreements with the EU are different in degree alternatively than in nature from the tailor-made agreement that the EaP state Armenia signed or the 1 that Azerbaijan is expected to yet conclude with Brussels. As such, there is no reason why Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, going forward, should not be treated on par with the EaP countries of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The convergence between the South Caucasus and Central Asia
Russia’s revanchist and imperialist actions have forced the political leaders in the states east and west of the Caspian Sea to rethink their relations with Russia and to rebalance their diplomatic alliances and trade relations. In the process, a truly Trans-Caspian dynamic is bringing the South Caucasus and Central Asia closer together.
The 2 regions are the key links in the east-west transport of energy and goods to Europe – known formally as the Trans-Caspian global Corridor (or informally as the mediate Corridor). Amid increasing demands for non-Russian transport routes, a flurry of Trans-Caspian activities has taken place with the aim of enhancing the mediate Corridor’s efficiency. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkey have agreed on a roadmap for the improvement of the corridor until 2027. They aspire to increase the capacity of the corridor to ten million tons, from the present capacity of around 2 million.
For this to happen, states along the mediate Corridor request to address respective constraints reducing the route’s attractiveness, specified as cumbersome transit and trade procedures; bottlenecks at border points and seaports; and insufficient container and vessel fleet capacity to handle large volumes of goods. In January 2024, EU officials took their most powerful stance yet by announcing that European and global investors would commit to invest 10 billion euros in a improvement programme for the mediate Corridor.
By establishing a Trans-Caspian Partnership, the EU would be in a much-enhanced position to support the improvement of energy and trade infrastructure in the region. Overall, it is in the European interest to advance regional connectivity in order to guarantee that the Central Asian states have options and do not become totally dependent on China and Russia for trade and investment. From a European perspective, Turkey’s location makes it a key state to have onboard in the redrawing of global trade routes. utilizing its alliance with Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus as a gateway, Ankara is beginning to grow its influence to the Turkic-speaking states in Central Asia. A Turkic bloc of cooperation – consisting of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – is rapidly emerging in fields as diverse as security, trade and culture.
In the current era of geopolitical competition, Russia is linking up with China and Iran, forming an axis of revisionist states bent on overturning the principles, rules and institutions of the post-Cold War global system. Unless this axis is countered, it might subjugate a large number of states in the process. It is so in the EU’s interest to encourage Turkey as a partial counterweight to the Beijing-Moscow-Tehran axis, as well as support and nurture the increasing alignment of the Turkic world. Brussels should encourage this group of states, strategically located east and west of the Caspian Sea, to align closer with the European safety architecture.
This is not an unrealistic proposal. The states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia have besides converged in their abroad policies. Albeit with different means, they all prosecute “multi-vector” abroad policies in their efforts to assert sovereignty while surrounded by various external powers. They do not want to be made to choose sides in the ongoing geopolitical confrontation. But to offset unhealthy dependencies on a nationalistic Russia and a rising China, they want more of a western presence, not less. Hence, the past years have seen increased European engagement bilaterally as well as in regional formats, specified as the yearly EU-Central Asia summits. While they argue any aspects of the post-Cold War global strategy and welcome a multipolar world, this word has a different meaning to these states, which are not anti-western by nature.
Democracy and safety in a Trans-Caspian Partnership
Some western sceptics may reject a closer EU partnership with the Central Asian states due to their democratic deficits and human rights transgressions. Yet, like in the South Caucasus, political reforms are more likely to win if they can benefit from the systematic assistance of the EU. Meanwhile, civilian society is simply a increasing force to be reckoned with even in Central Asia. The younger generations are exposed to the influences of the planet to a much greater degree than their parents. As a result, a clear divergence has emerged between the russian and “post-Soviet” generations, with this second group more independent of Russian information sources and thinking, and little passive with regards to social and political matters. Youth activists are increasingly engaging in the country’s future, but they do it through another means than conventional non-governmental organizations, which are associated with an older generation. There is thus area to devise fresh ways of interacting with and supporting the fresh generation that is coming to the fore. specified opportunities would be enhanced if they were part of an integrated EU policy platform.
The EaP was never a policy framework devised for wartime situations. It so lacks a safety component. Instead, the EU is crafting individual safety partnerships, most notably a long-term safety agreement with Ukraine, but besides a fresh defence and safety partnership with Moldova. A fresh Trans-Caspian Partnership must feature safety matters to aid these countries defend themselves against various forms of malign abroad influences and interference. but for Azerbaijan, which has a defence pact with Turkey, the regional states deficiency real protections for their security. respective of the states are members of the Russian-led Collective safety Treaty Organization (CSTO) but due to Moscow’s demonstrated disregard for the sovereignty of erstwhile russian states, this creates more of a problem than a solution. A revanchist Russian government has long deployed a wide array of tactics and instruments to guarantee its strategical dominance over these countries. As Moscow becomes an increasingly unreliable, isolated and fearsome partner, regional policymakers are pushing to diversify their safety partnerships.
Assisting the Central Asian states to build functional full defence policies and make effective early informing and early consequence capabilities would aid strengthen their resilience against military and non-military threats alike. Moreover, the EU should besides step up its support for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s joint efforts to further strengthen regional cooperation in Central Asia. This would build safety and stableness from within the region, thereby decreasing regional states’ vulnerability to manipulation from revisionist powers. Finally, to truly gain from Trans-Caspian cooperation, the EU should double down on its contributions to the peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. A peace treaty would possibly open an entirely fresh dynamic in the Caspian region, benefitting safety and stableness as well as trade and prosperity.
In sum, while the first goals of the EaP have been shattered, the hard line between the South Caucasus and Central Asia is now rapidly dissolving. A truly Trans-Caspian dynamic is emerging, and it is in the strategical interest of the EU to add impetus to this development. Establishing a Trans-Caspian Partnership would be the most effective and coherent way of doing so.
Johan Engvall, PhD, works at the Stockholm Centre for east European Studies (SCEEUS), based at the Swedish Institute of global Affairs. His expertise is on home and abroad policy issues in east Europe and Central Asia. His publications have appeared in respective academic and policy journals, including Governance, Post-Soviet Affairs, diary of Democracy, abroad Policy and The National Interest.
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