Nuclear Deterrence Requires Only Dozens Of Warheads – Not Thousands
Via Brian McGlinchey at Stark Realities
Over the next decade, the US government plans to spend nearly $1 trillion on its nuclear arsenal — with the actual cost certain to run even higher than that. The huge outlay is driven in part by the sheer size of America’s doomsday-weapon collection, which comprises an estimated 3,700 deployed or stockpiled nuclear warheads, not counting another 1,500 that are purportedly “retired” and awaiting dismantlement.
Though Americans have been conditioned to think it’s reasonable to maintain such a large arsenal, the idea that thousands of warheads are required to deter nuclear aggression rests on flawed thinking about the nature of deterrence. While defense contractors and military bureaucracies enriched by the status quo will tell you otherwise, the truth is that an adequate arsenal of nuclear warheads can be measured not in thousands, but mere dozens.
During the Cold War, two successive doctrines guided nuclear war strategy. First came Massive Retaliation, which rested on the threat of a disproportionate, devastating nuclear response to either conventional or nuclear aggression. That gave way to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), in which any nuclear attack was guaranteed to escalate to the point where both countries are completely destroyed.
Both doctrines shared a cornerstone premise — that effective, credible deterrence requires the capability to completely destroy the opposing country. That’s the wrong yardstick. Deterrence is achieved by the ability to impose an intolerable level of retaliatory destruction on a country that’s contemplating a nuclear first-strike — a threshold far lower than border-to-border annihilation.
For perspective, in World War II, Russia and China each suffered roughly 20 million total civilian and military deaths. The same unfathomable fatality counts that spanned several years in World War II can be achieved in mere minutes with only 20 modern nuclear warheads — 15 striking Russian cities and only five hitting the more densely-populated cities of China, according to calculations by University of Maryland professor Steve Fetter.
If the United States chose to opt against the morally-repugnant targeting of population centers with little military significance (that is, cities similar to Hiroshima and Nagasaki), a second-strike could instead vaporize the enemy’s economy, targeting power generation, refinery complexes and vital ports (though even these nuclear attacks would inflict civilian death on a huge scale, not only from the blasts but also the economic destruction). Here, Fetter calculates 100 detonations would suffice.
The fatalities and destruction associated with either of those two targeting scenarios that pursue some level of societal devastation — so-called “countervalue targeting” — are well beyond what any foreign ruler would consider tolerable, suggesting that the anticipation of even one or two second-strike warheads would be sufficient to deter an adversary from striking first.
Note, this approach to deterrence, which focuses on the power to retaliate and inflict “intolerable” destruction, does not require adversaries with high moral character. It matters little whether an opposing ruler regards his citizens with loving empathy or depraved indifference. Rulers are ultimately driven by self-interest — and no leader can expect his hold on power to survive a nuclear gamble that brings about the vaporization of cities or irreplaceable economic assets in his own country. (Indeed, there may be no “power” to hold on to.) As political scientist Kenneth Waltz wrote in a milestone 1990 paper that promoted the peacekeeping value of nuclear weapons while making the case that small arsenals are sufficient, “Rulers like to continue to rule.”
Given these realities of deterrence, the size of an adversary’s nuclear arsenal has no bearing on the appropriate size of America’s. “So long as two or more countries have second-strike forces, to compare them is pointless,” wrote Waltz. “If no state can launch a disarming attack with high confidence, force comparisons become irrelevant…beyond a certain level of capability, additional forces provide no additional coverage for one party and pose no additional threat to others.”
In contrast to countervalue targeting, “counterforce targeting” aims to inflict military defeat by destroying a large, diverse array of military targets, such as missile silos, bomber and submarine bases, command and control facilities, and conventional forces.
Counterforce-targeting is what led both America and Russia to amass far larger arsenals than that of any other nuclear-armed country. Beyond the elevated general risk associated with securing, transporting, maintaining and training with these large volumes of warheads, the mutual targeting of nuclear weapon delivery platforms pursuant to counterforce doctrine encourages first strikes — launched out fear that an opponent’s first strike would render one’s own weapons unusable.
Aside from the heightened risk of miscalculations during crises and accidental explosions during peace, America’s outsized nuclear arsenal threatens national security in a way that has nothing to do with mushroom clouds — by nudging the United States further along its path to financial catastrophe. As then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mike Mullen warned in 2010, “The most significant threat to our national security is our debt.” His statement came when the national debt was only about a third of its current $36.8 trillion.
Of the trillion dollars to be spent on nuclear weapons through 2034, $460 billion will be spent on a “modernization” program that encompasses warheads, missiles and silos and submarines. Of that, the Pentagon expects to spend $120 billion to replace the current generation of land-based, Minuteman III ICBMs with Sentinel ICBMs made by Northrop Grumman. Last year, the Air Force notified Congress that the Sentinel program would cost 37% more than the previous estimate, and take two years longer to implement. If the history of Pentagon weapon procurement is any guide, we can count on more such announcements in the coming years.
Considered in the context of second-strike deterrence, the Sentinel program is particularly exasperating. Given their fixed locations in satellite-observable silos, land-based ICBMs represent the most vulnerable leg in the nuclear-arms triad, which also includes bombers and submarine-launched missiles. Put another way, it’s the leg that does the least to convince a nuclear adversary that the United States has a guaranteed second-strike capacity — which is the only strike capacity that matters. At the same time, land-based ICBMs are a magnet for enemy missiles, with one study suggesting nuclear strikes on US ICBMs could kill 300 million people across North America.
Hiding in plain sight: Land-based ICBMs — like this one near Monarch, Montana — comprise the most vulnerable leg in the nuclear triad (via Moose Radio 94.7)In February, President Trump expressed dismay at the ongoing development of new nukes:
“There’s no reason for us to be building brand new nuclear weapons. We already have so many. You could destroy the world 50 times over, 100 times over. And here we are building new nuclear weapons, and they’re building nuclear weapons.”
Trump’s remarks came as he expressed interest in opening new arms control negotiations with Russia and China. That’s a noble pursuit, but when a second-strike capability is all the United States needs for defense, a case can be made for blazing a unilateral path toward rational and frugal nuclear deterrence — particularly when you consider the dangerously destabilizing nature of a huge arsenal built for counterforce targeting.
“There is no compelling military or strategic rationale for linking the size of U.S. nuclear forces to those of other nuclear weapon states,” wrote Fetter. “As long as the United States has enough survivable warheads to deter and respond to nuclear attacks, it should not matter how many weapons other countries have.” That’s not to discount the risk-reducing value of a far smaller Russian arsenal.
Ballistic missile submarines — like the USS West Virginia — do the most to assure an enemy of America’s second-strike capability (US Navy)Alas, any move toward a dramatically slimmer US nuclear warhead inventory will face fierce opposition from those who benefit from today’s emphasis on numerical superiority. The status quo is a prime example of the principle of “concentrated benefits and diffused costs.” Via both taxation and inflation, the $1 trillion cost of sustaining and upgrading the arsenal over the next 10 years will be spread across hundreds of millions of Americans, including many who haven’t been born yet. Shuffled into the $90 trillion the US government is projected to spend over that same period, the cost flies under the radar of everyday Americans, precluding major political opposition.
The financial benefits, on the other hand, accrue to a relatively small number of stakeholders, from arms manufacturers to Pentagon and Department of Energy bureaucracies. The enjoyment of concentrated benefits incentivizes these stakeholders to fiercely defend the status quo, deploying a formidable influence arsenal that includes lobbyists, campaign contributions, the promises of jobs in 50 states and hundreds of congressional districts, and financial sponsorship of national security think tanks that steer policy.
While those who are enriched by America’s excessive nuclear arsenal have the upper hand, the status quo is so dangerous and wasteful that Americans of all political leanings should unite in challenging it.
Stark Realities undermines official narratives, demolishes conventional wisdom and exposes fundamental myths across the political spectrum. Read more and subscribe for free at starkrealities.substack.com
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of ZeroHedge
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Tyler Durden
Sat, 05/03/2025 – 22:10
