New defence initiatives in Europe, specified as the EU’s safety Action for Europe (SAFE) programme, have generated considerable momentum. little noticed has been the memorandum of understanding on defence between Turkey and Poland, signed last year. The paper is simply a modest one, reflecting the decorum of the Turkish-Polish defence partnership: Turkey and Poland are allies, they cooperate in NATO, and Poland had previously purchased Bayraktar drones. Yet the relation thus far has remained mostly transactional.
Nonetheless, the Turkish-Polish defence partnership can and should become much more than what it is now: a powerful bilateral partnership that could form Europe’s evolving defence architecture. specified a partnership would be in the interests of both Turkey and Poland. For Turkey, a bilateral partnership with Poland offers access to European projects which would address Turkey’s weak spots in air defence as well as offer a large marketplace for Turkey’s defence industry. For Poland, a bilateral partnership with Turkey means that the country’s existing strategy based on artillery and armour – and the NATO strategy in Poland of aerial reconnaissance – can undergo a major upgrade by integrating Turkish capabilities in the field of electromagnetic warfare and drones, making NATO’s east Flank truly formidable.
Poland’s needs
Poland views deterrence of Russia as a primary safety objective. This is not just about averting a conventional Russian invasion in Europe, a hazard that inactive seems low despite the bloodshed in Ukraine. It is besides about countering the more immediate threat of drone incursions or hybrid attacks. If not rapidly countered western capitals could find themselves in the situation of having to decide whether to face Russia decisively or letting the substance slide, eroding NATO’s Article 5 guarantee.
It is so in Poland’s interest that Polish defences are robust adequate to counter threats immediately. Accordingly, Poland’s national safety strategy advocates deterrence in all domains against Russia. It has besides been frequently expressed by Poland’s abroad Minister, Radosław Sikorski, who in an address before the parliament (Sejm) earlier this year notably warned against inertia: “We cannot afford paralysis. Passivity or relying on others is an invitation to escalation.”
Small-scale Russian actions are not a theoretical scenario. A railway incidental in November 2025 was identified by Polish authorities as an act of sabotage. In September 2025 there was an incursion of about 20 drones into Polish airspace, forcing the closure of Warsaw’s airport. Only due to the actions of NATO’s fast consequence Force were the drones taken down. Fortunately for Poland, NATO’s consequence mechanisms keep a advanced operational tempo towards day-to-day threats.
Nonetheless, it is inactive in Poland’s interest to be able to respond immediately, relying as much as possible on its own resources and to make certain NATO defences are at their upmost capability. As expressed by Sikorski, Poland’s solution to defence is not just being a passive station for NATO systems, but to build a strong military with its own equipment, its own doctrines, and its own inventory.
Turkey’s needs
In this context, there are 2 dimensions to Turkey’s needs. First, are Turkey’s requirements for its own defence, and second are the interests of Turkey’s burgeoning defence industry, which the government seeks to develop.
Turkey’s defence manufacture takes a large interest in what is happening in European defence, mostly due to possible economical benefits. In 2021, EU associate states spent 218 billion euros on defence; by 2025, that figure had risen to 392 billion. The EU’s Readiness 2030 initiative foresees up to 800 billion euros in defence spending by the end of the decade, most of it at the national level, though respective crucial EU-wide programmes besides exist. The largest is the European Defence Fund, the European Commission’s main instrument for financing defence projects, with around 8 billion euros allocated under the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework. It is complemented by the European Defence manufacture Programme (EDIP), which provides grants and incentives to strengthen Europe’s defence industrial base and received 1.5 billion euros for 2025–2027. Another mechanism, the European Defence manufacture Reinforcement through Common Procurement (EDIRPA), supports joint procurement by associate states and had a budget of 310 million in 2025. Together, these EU-level instruments amount to about 9.8 billion euros.
All this financially dwarfs Turkey’s defence industry. Estimates of Turkey’s defence and aerospace industries’ full yearly turnover for 2025 are about 14-15 billion euros. With Turkey’s focus on drones and another mid-range systems, it is in a position to scale production and export at gross generating volumes should Turkish firms have access to European funds, their profits would be great. For Turkey, the prospects of sales to the European Union are dizzying in their scale.
Then there are Turkey’s own defence interests. In this regard, cooperation with Europe is desirable. Turkey’s and Europe’s defence industries are complementary: while Turkey specializes in inexpensive drones and newer equipment to be utilized in electromagnetic warfare, Europe’s industries specialize in well-established technologies like tanks, jets, and radar systems. Turkey especially wants these to address its large problem: air defence. Weakness in air defence is peculiarly concerning in a time of advanced capabilities in aerial offence, as demonstrated by events from Venezuela to Lebanon to Iran.
Indeed, Turkey’s request for air defence is not theoretical. It faces multiple challenges; frictions with the Syrian Democratic Forces, volatile relations with Israel and Iran, and the Russian threat in Europe. Turkey has attempted, with small success, to fortify its air defences. It long sought to get a Patriot rocket defence system, only to be denied and purchased a Russian S-400 rocket defence system, causing any controversy in relations with the United States. Only just now, in March 2026, has Turkey had any success in acquiring a Patriot strategy – although it is inactive under Allied command. This likely reflects a pragmatic shift to prioritizing regional security, driven by the conflict in the mediate East. The takeaway seems to be that Turkey’s defence safety relies on active cooperation and partnership with its western allies.
One boon of cooperation with allies in Europe would be in fighter planes for Turkey. Europe possesses advanced fighter planes, like the Eurofighter, which can deny the enemy the chance to launch as well as intercept incoming missiles. As air systems, they can execute these tasks more flexibly than ground systems. The effectiveness of a medium-range air-to-air defence mechanics was demonstrated in Pakistan’s confrontation with India in early 2025. The integration of Turkish and European systems, in particular, the integration of European airplanes and fighter jets with Turkish drone and electromagnetic capabilities, offers a formidable combination. Financially and strategically, there is much to be gained for Turkey from partnership with Europe.
Turkey and Poland military cooperation
These financial and strategical imperatives mostly explain why Turks have taken specified an interest in Brussels. Unsurprisingly, Turkey’s president, Recep Erdoğan, has said “European safety is unimaginable without Turkey” or that Hakan Fidan, minister of abroad affairs, said that “a safety architecture approach that leaves out a military force like Turkey, would not be very realistic”. Turkey has participated in the European Sky Shield Initiative and Turkey has signed a Eurofighter acquisition and training agreement with the United Kingdom. Turkish defence giant Baykar signed a task with Italian defence maker Leonardo to jointly produce drones.
Yet the large prize of accessing and developing technologies with EU backing has eluded Turkey. Criteria for membership in major European programmes vary, but frequently require being a European associate state or, as in the Canadian case, explicit inclusion in European programmes as a 3rd country. Turkey is not an EU associate state, nor has it had much success in being included as an authoritative 3rd country. Indeed, Turkey was not accepted into SAFE. Yet due to the very fact that defence is not a core EU competency, much can be done in that field bilaterally. It makes sense for Turkey to be included in European projects and the European defence environment through cooperation with an EU associate state. EU associate states stay free to collaborate with whomever they want in defence and to access EU funding.
In this context, a Polish-Turkish defence partnership carries quite a few potential. Poland’s doctrine emphasizes mobile firepower. In terms of airpower, this frequently translates to buying American jets, specified as F-35s and F-16s for offence. For air defence, Poland has Patriot and Narew units. The first counters large scale rocket threats; the second, cruise missiles and aircraft. This is simply a robust strategy, but it inactive has weak spots in terms of drones and electronic warfare. Poland’s layered air defence – centred on systems specified as Patriot and Narew – is formidable in kinetic terms but remains dependent on the integrity of the electromagnetic environment. In a battlefield increasingly defined by saturation, deception, and low-cost aerial threats, as demonstrated by the wars in Iran and Ukraine, the ability not only to intercept but to degrade and disorganize incoming attacks becomes decisive. Those 2 abilities are what is needed in Ukraine and indeed on Poland’s borders which face the anticipation of incursions from Belarus and Russia.
It is precisely here that Turkish systems supply complementarity as a force multiplier, shaping the battlespace in advance of interception or strike. On the 1 hand, Turkey fields capable drones like ANKA and the much-lauded Bayraktar TB2 for long-endurance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. On the another hand, Turkey has ground systems like the radar jamming and deception KORAL system, and the drone jamming IHTAR. These cover the exact gap in Polish doctrine. Poland has a strategy for major rocket threats, the Patriot batteries; and it has a strategy for hitting drones and smaller planes, the Narew. These are to be integrated with airborne radar detection, inactive operating on 20th century principles. Poland and NATO deficiency the systems controlling and shaping the electromagnetic battlespace across a wide theatre another than classical radar instruments, peculiarly regarding smaller scale threats like drones.
Cooperation in terms of drones and electronic warfare with Turkey besides makes sense regarding Poland’s land capabilities, where Poland’s approach emphasizes artillery and armour. The importance of artillery has been a clear lesson from the modern battlefield, which has emerged as the mainstays of the Ukrainian theatre. Poland is investing in deep fires (HIMARS) and sustained fires (Thunder K9 and AHS Krab). With Turkish electromagnetic capabilities, this artillery, already strong in terms of firepower, could become more accurate. As for armour, Poland is building a large tank force, composed of American M1A2 Abrams – 1 of the most sophisticated conflict tanks in usage and highly interoperable with NATO systems – as well as K2 Black Panther (with its local production variant K2PL) and modernized but legacy Leopard 2 tanks, which supply a sturdy fleet. Together with this is an armoured personnel carrier force, featuring the KTO Rosomak and Borsuk IFV, both native Polish systems.
Yet, the key to effective armour in modern times seems to be in making certain armour is defended against drones. That can be done either by having firepower capable of denying the enemy the chance to launch drones, or through method adaptions, like what is seen in in Ukraine, with cages have been fitted onto tanks to prevent drones from coming besides close to harm the tank. Another trend is friendly drones which aid defend the tank. Regarding this aspect, cooperation with Turkey in terms of drones would again be beneficial.
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The wisdom of bilateral cooperation
Aside from the complementarity of Turkish and Polish weapon systems, stronger defence collaboration between Warsaw and Ankara is simply a more effective way to organize cooperation than doing things through Brussels. An Ankara-Warsaw axis has the possible to form the defence environment in Europe and spearhead initiatives coming from Brussels. The reason for this is the restraints of the safety policy environment in Brussels, where the main problem is that cooperation in Europe is on a per-project basis.
The current strategy centres on the Directorate-General of Defence manufacture and Space, whose main financing instrument is the European Defence Fund (EDF) which finances projects through competitive, call-based grants. These calls are aligned with agreed EU priorities and are designed to incentivize cross-border cooperation. Submitted task proposals are evaluated by independent experts, and successful initiatives receive EU co-financing. The EU priorities themselves are not set by the Directorate-General. Like all EU aims they derive from the deliberations of the Council of the European Union, the European Council, and the European Parliament.
There is another more flexible body, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), but PESCO is only a forum where associate states propose projects, which others may join or stay out of. Though it designs requirements, joint planning, and regular coordination meetings for projects, small of this is binding. PESCO’s importance lies in the fact that it provides guidelines for the European Defence Fund. PESCO funds are besides limited in what projects they may fund and how.
New initiatives like the safety Action for Europe (SAFE) would add on programmes to facilitate joint procurement by associate states, but do not promise to change the administrative makeup of the strategy in Brussels.
While cooperation with Brussels may be crucial for Turkey, the fact that EU funds are mostly based on restricted calls, securing Turkey’s permanent and direct adhesion to the European defence framework promises to be a herculean task. It requires masterful deal-making and uncovering consensus among EU associate states and institutions. That is simply a tall order for any non-EU country: there are fundamental questions as to doctrine and industrial burden-sharing before the question of cooperation with Turkey can be addressed. European Union defence projects must by plan favour cooperation between associate states themselves before any 3rd country. This is not even to mention the possible of objections by the Greeks and Cypriots for any EU task involving Turkey. Thus, for Turkey a bilateral initiative with Poland alternatively is more appealing.
Poland should besides realize that a sound defensive doctrine requires a strategical imagination alternatively than a collection of haphazard projects. Per-project cooperation, nevertheless valuable, does not replace a bilateral partnership with a country that complements its current materiel makeup, like Turkey. Poland would besides be hard-pressed in uncovering a partner that offers a more specialised suite of capabilities than Turkey. There is the United States, but it has prioritised higher-end systems, whereas Turkey has focused on scalable drone deployment. And despite the masterfulness of American weaponry, it is Turkey that performed the first full autonomous flight of unmanned vehicles – Turkey may even be ahead of the US in drone technology.
There are no diplomatic impediments for Poland to prosecute closer defence cooperation with Turkey. Poland and Turkey enjoy strong bilateral diplomatic relations, and though Turkey may be little forceful in its rhetoric regarding Russia, both countries support the current NATO position in east Europe and support Ukraine. Moreover, a cohesive bilateral defence strategy is certain to act as a catalyst in Brussels, attracting another actors, countries and companies eager to capitalise on the momentum. alternatively than waiting for a centralised EU defence policy to emerge, Turkey and Poland can establish a precedent that Brussels will not only accommodate but besides take direction from.
Ultimately, it is frequently better to make a partnership first than to wait for consensus to emerge. While Turkey’s and Poland’s memorandum seems modest, it provides the framework for a deeper alliance to be built.
Onur Anamur is simply a Turkish-Canadian author on global affairs, defense, and energy. He is simply a postgraduate of mediate East method University, in Ankara, Turkey.
