The wolf appeared towards the end of my conversation with Fernando Casal Bértoa. We were discussing political parties and abroad interference erstwhile the associate prof. at the University of Nottingham reached for an analogy. Entrusting the defence of democracy to a organization dependent on a abroad authoritarian government, he suggested, was like putting a wolf in charge of sheep.
“The wolf says it is vegetarian,” I replied.
“Exactly.”
For Moldovan voters dissatisfied with the governing Action and Solidarity organization (PAS), the difficulty is deciding whom to trust with the European future it has promised. A rival may support EU membership while differing sharply over the reforms, alliances and rules that would take the country there.
When I asked the prof. how specified voters could replace their government, he began with what should have been an unremarkable answer. In a average country, they would vote for another party. Moldova, he argued, has “a dysfunctional organization system”.
Several opposition parties besides claim to support EU accession, and any have backed it at the ballot box and in parliament. Their records deserve separate scrutiny. Support for accession, independency from abroad sponsors, and respect for electoral rules are different measures of political credibility.
Who earns the European label?
Ion Ceban, the mayor of Chișinău and leader of the National alternate Movement (MAN) offers 1 of the clearest examples of political conversion. In July 2014, as a Socialist MP, he voted against ratifying Moldova’s Association Agreement with the EU. He besides protested against the agreement in Brussels and advocated for the Russia-led Customs Union. A organization publication of the period recorded his position approvingly.
A decade later, MAN registered to run for a Yes vote in the constitutional referendum on European integration. Ziarul de Gardă reported that Ceban had not encouraged a Yes vote on his social media pages during the campaign. Ceban disputed the report, saying MAN activists had distributed run materials and promoted the referendum across the country.
In October 2022, the US Treasury said a squad led by the Russian influence operative Yuriy Gudilin had offered support to MAN as Moscow sought to recover the influence lost by Moldova’s older pro-Russian political elite. The message did not sanction MAN or Ceban, and an offer of support does not by itself establish that the recipient accepted it. Ceban challenged the allegations surrounding the announcement and sought explanations from the US embassy.
Romania subsequently imposed an entry ban on him in July 2025. Bucharest’s abroad Minister Oana Țoiu cited documented links with Russian representatives, while Ceban denied those links and described the decision as political in nature. The public explanation did not disclose the underlying dossier.
In April 2026, Ceban announced MAN’s departure from the Alternativa bloc of parties. Its MPs would stay in the parliamentary faction, he said, but MAN would distance itself from statements and actions contrary to European integration.
Ion Chicu’s organization of improvement and Consolidation of Moldova (PDCM), presents a different case. Its September 2024 run announcement affirmed European integration and proposed a referendum after accession negotiations. That same month, Chicu publically explained how a boycott could deny the impending constitutional referendum the turnout needed for validation, even if an overwhelming majority of those voting supported it.
Chicu argued that Sandu was utilizing the vote for electoral advantage. He declared support for accession while campaigning to invalidate the referendum intended to anchor it in the constitution.
Democracy at Home, which is led by Vasile Costiuc, supported a Yes vote in 2024. Its six MPs besides backed the first-reading vote to close the Russian Cultural Centre in November 2025, a measurement opposed by respective another opposition factions. These votes make it harder to treat Moldova’s opposition as a single political camp. The party’s recruitment and run financing rise separate questions about how it competes.
What survives a organization ban
Professor Casal Bértoa believes banning a organization should be a last resort. “No organization should be banned unless banning it is the only way to defend democracy,” he says. This is besides the approach of the European Court of Human Rights.
He supports sanctions where organizations usage illicit backing or effort to evade restrictions through successor parties. What matters is whether the leadership, organization and money stay the same. A fresh name does small to change a political operation run by the same people with the same resources.
In 2026, Democracy at Home nominated Victor Perțu for mayor of Orhei. Following a complaint from his PAS rival, Sergiu Stanciu, the electoral commission cancelled Perțu’s registration, citing continuing links with the outlawed Șor party’s network and indications of a concealed electoral bloc. After conflicting lower court rulings, the ultimate Court declared Perțu’s own appeal inadmissible on May 16th. Costiuc disputed the evidence and called the exclusion political.
The decision afraid a peculiar candidacy and its run network. It did not establish that Democracy at Home as a full was a successor to Șor, a discrimination that matters erstwhile assessing whether a sanction should mark a candidate or an organization.
To explain the advantage illicit backing gives a party, the prof. turns to football. A squad fielding a twelfth player gains an advantage over competitors who respect the rules. “Democracy is not only about elections or voting,” he says. “It is voting and the regulation of law.”
Excluding a organization requires evidence, a proportionate sanction, and a meaningful chance to appeal. It besides removes a choice from voters who may have played no part in the violation.
The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ (ODIHR) final assessment of the 2025 parliamentary election described a competitive competition undermined by abroad interference, illicit financing, cyber-attacks and disinformation. It besides found that the exclusion of 2 parties in the last 2 days before voting limited their right to an effective remedy. Among its recommendations were clear, solid evidence concerning de-registration and effective opportunities to competition restrictions. Dissolution, suspension and exclusion from an election besides have distinct consequences for members and voters.
The prof. favours clearer legal provisions on the burden of proof in successor organization cases and the effect of appeals, as noted by the Venice Commission itself. He places weight on the successive checks carried out by electoral authorities and courts. Those safeguards are meaningful only if a contestant can answer the case against it, peculiarly erstwhile evidence is classified.
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Who can afford to compete?
In October 2025, the ultimate Court of Justice upheld the withdrawal of Democracy at Home’s public allocations for 12 months over repeated run finance violations. The organization argued that its online scope was organic and that it had neither requested nor authorized abroad citizens’ support.
The Constitutional Court recorded the electoral commission’s findings concerning abroad involvement, digital promotion and undeclared expenses, but concluded that the violations, considered separately, were not adequate to affect the election result. It validated the parliamentary mandates. The organization could take its seats while losing public money.
That money matters between elections, erstwhile parties must pay staff, keep branches and persuade members to stay after a defeat.
Professor Casal Bértoa initially describes Moldova as “too generous” in backing parties. erstwhile I ask whether public backing should be cut, he rejects the idea. Reducing the overall subsidy could leave organizations more dependent on oligarchs or sources abroad.
“You do not cut public funding,” he says. “You may even request to increase it.”
He wants less beneficiaries. Parties that attract negligible support should not, in his view, be kept alive indefinitely at public expense.
His proposed threshold is between 2 and 3 per cent of the vote, concentrating resources on parties that have demonstrated electoral support. Newcomers without an established organization or wealthy backer would inactive gotta finance the run that determines whether they qualify.
The improvement package presented by the Association for Participatory Democracy (ADEPT) in July 2026 proposed a 2 per cent threshold at parliamentary or local elections and a link between part of the public allocation and membership fees. ADEPT reported that the 2026 allocation exceeded 66.6 million lei (3.3 million euros), with 44 parties receiving funding.
Linking funds to membership could encourage parties to build support beyond their chief donors, provided the contributions are genuine. A threshold, however, would besides have consequences for newcomers struggling to establish themselves.
Asked what would show success after a single electoral cycle, the political scientist challenges the timetable. “Institutions require time,” he says. His interest is in organizations that make over respective elections, alternatively than reforms whose effects can be declared after the first result.
An alternate from within?
Durable political competition besides requires parties capable of surviving their leaders. Fernando Casal Bértoa identifies 3 possible routes to a credible pro-European alternative: a fresh party, a change in the existing opposition or a divided within PAS. He considers the 3rd the most plausible, describing a script alternatively than an result he advocates.
Sandu stepped down as PAS leader and resigned her organization membership in December 2020. Bértoa’s argument concerns the political influence she continues to exert, not a formal position in the organization. erstwhile that unifying influence recedes, he suggests, PAS may conflict to hold together. A divided could produce competing pro-European formations or aid the existing opposition win power.
He identifies neither a timetable nor a circumstantial interior dispute that would trigger a split. Whether any resulting parties could cooperate while competing for government remains an open question.
The institutions a successor inherits
An eventual change of government would besides test the institutions PAS leaves behind. The prof. argues that the independency of public tv must last the party’s departure from office. Its board and management request protections that endure erstwhile the parliamentary majority changes.
His argument draws on the thought of organization forbearance, the restraint politicians exercise even erstwhile the law gives them area to act. “You may have the power to appoint the tv director, but you should not appoint your brother,” he says.
The example is simply a informing about the exercise of political power, not evidence that a peculiar appointment in Moldova was improper. The independency of public broadcasting depends in part on how its managers are appointed, the grounds for their dismissal, and the safety of its funding.
Moldova’s accession negotiations formally opened in June 2024, beginning work that will outlast individual administrations. Sustaining it will require political organizations able to compete over how the country is governed while accepting the organization limits membership entails.
Opposition parties must show their commitments through their finances, partners and conduct, including erstwhile they lose. PAS must accept that support for accession does not give it a permanent claim to power. Voters can support accession and inactive want individual else to run the government.
Ana Pisarenco is simply a writer based in Moldova. She runs the independent media task eurOpinii.
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