It is simply a common cliché in global affairs that geopolitics, like nature, abhors a vacuum. Before the dust has settled at any flashpoint around the globe, mediate and large powers alike usually begin scrambling to prosecute their collective, competing, and distinct interests.
If always there were a textbook example of this phenomenon, it would be found somewhere in the South Caucasus. The region sits at the crossroads of the erstwhile Russian, Persian and Ottoman empires. The 3 states that comprise it – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – proceed to experience the consequences of regional influence exerted by both Türkiye and Iran, while remaining firmly within what many describe as Russia’s “near abroad”.
Notoriously complex, the region has late attracted expanding political attention as Moscow has been compelled to divert resources and focus to the Ukrainian frontlines. A shift of this kind carries significance, as the South Caucasus besides lies straight along the Trans-Caspian global Transport Route or alleged “Middle Corridor” – a strategical vector for China’s wider geoeconomic ambitions. It has simultaneously drawn US attention as well, most notably erstwhile the Trump administration brokered the Armenia–Azerbaijan agreement (TRIPP) in August.
The European Union, otherwise reluctant to presume a geopolitical function in its east neighbourhood, has besides emerged as an increasingly engaged actor, viewing the region as a strategical chance to extend its influence amid a shifting scenery of trade routes and economical prospects.
Currencies of power
Alas, the EU has frequently struggled to convert intent into a coherent strategy in the South Caucasus. Brussels has long aspired to be the region’s geoeconomic anchor, an nonsubjective only fitting for president von der Leyen’s imagination of a “geopolitical Commission” and the Union as a truly global player. However, the bloc’s approach in this part of the planet is frequently seen as fragmented, cautious, and mostly reactive. Hesitation of this kind usually comes at a price, especially erstwhile pragmatism and economical interests compete with ideological leanings among those the EU engages with in the post-Soviet neighbourhood.
Growing connectivity in the region has emerged as a key origin of power in the South Caucasus. Railways, energy corridors, and digital routes now extend beyond trade flows and increasingly form geopolitical posture, allowing those who control key networks to benefit from strategical partnerships with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
While the United States has pushed forward with its high-profile connectivity project linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenia – further highlighted by Vice president JD Vance’s recent visit to the region – the EU has stalled on advancing its own comparable flagship proposal. Instead, the Union continues to trust mainly on initiatives under its Global Gateway strategy, which, though effective, do not necessarily constitute a large-scale strategical framework for the South Caucasus.
This hesitation is all the more striking given what is at stake for the EU, as the ever-growing substance of European safety will yet be shaped not only by the bloc’s decisions on its safety architecture, but besides by the geopolitical alliances it forges. Nonetheless, as it navigates an always more contested arena, the EU should be wary of partnerships that carry deal-breaking limitations – even with those who initially appear to share its objectives.
perceive to the latest Talk east Europe podcast episode:
Transit routes and transit alliances
There is an increasingly common consensus that the European Union cannot afford to circumvent Türkiye in the region. The relation between the 2 is frequently perceived as being built on results and pragmatism, if not necessarily on shared values. Through energy and transport initiatives, Ankara remains a key transit hub for Caspian resources heading to Europe, serving as a bridge between the West, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia.
At the core of this, from Azerbaijan en way to European markets, lie the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and its extension, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The EU’s 2022 Memorandum of Understanding with Azerbaijan to double gas imports by 2027 explicitly recognizes Türkiye’s function in this corridor, emphasizing Ankara’s indispensability in the EU’s evolving energy architecture. Similarly, the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), carrying natural gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field through Georgia to Türkiye, anchors the confederate Gas Corridor through which Caspian energy yet flows westward.
Interconnection in this context besides manifests in transport infrastructure, where Türkiye’s support for the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway aligns with the EU’s investments under its Global Gateway strategy. All of this occurs within a shared commitment to promoting energy and transport diversification, a precedence that has grown more urgent for the EU as it seeks to reduce its dependence on Russian supplies. With these objectives in sight, any would argue that overlooking Ankara would constitute a strategical mistake, undermining the impact of EU engagement with the region at a time erstwhile a strategical vacuum is emerging.
However, Türkiye’s abroad policy since the end of the Cold War, and especially under president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has evolved considerably. What was erstwhile a strategy focused on regional integration and mediation, based on free-trade arrangements and diplomatic initiatives from the mediate East to the Western Balkans, has given way to a notably more assertive and ad hoc approach. Erdoğan’s government has become notorious for effectively striking one-off deals, whether by leveraging exile flows or NATO membership approvals to extract concessions, alternatively than building on consistent multilateral policies. Ultimately, erstwhile it does, Ankara has sought closer relations outside its conventional alliance framework, becoming a dialog partner to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and, more recently, applying to join BRICS.
As much as the country’s increasingly transactional approach seems consistent with a global trend, it carries profound consequences for its possible to be seen as a reliable partner in its wider neighbourhood. Türkiye’s retreat from the function of mediator is evident peculiarly in the South Caucasus, where its alliance with Azerbaijan spearheads its regional policy. president Erdoğan famously describes both countries as “one nation, 2 states”, a slogan reflecting a shared Turkic identity that has defined Ankara-Baku relations since the 1990s.
Through military training, arms transfers, and the supply of advanced drones, Türkiye played an instrumental role in Azerbaijan’s victories over Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and its subsequent 2023 campaign. Both reverberated across the region, as this not only reconfigured the Armenia-Azerbaijan balance but besides showcased Turkish defence technology and resolve. However, by tying its possible rapprochement with Armenia entirely to Baku’s preferences, Türkiye effectively granted president Ilham Aliyev’s government veto power over Turkish–Armenian relations, underscoring Ankara’s frequently limited ability to act as an honest broker in the region.
These self-imposed limitations and Türkiye’s preference for scoring bilateral wins over the goal of long-term regional stableness should rise a red flag for the EU. If Türkiye’s commitment in the Caucasus remains contingent on Erdoğan’s home calculations, a plausible hazard is that the country could keep making ad hoc shifts that yet leave the EU sidelined.
Strategic hazard and the limits of alignment
Admittedly, the Union’s approach to the South Caucasus has frequently been haphazard and reactive alternatively than strategic, as its engagement in the region remains mostly country-specific. However, with a strategical beginning in sight, the EU is increasingly better positioned to view the South Caucasus not simply through the narrow lenses of energy, post-conflict aid, and ad hoc engagement, but as a geopolitical space in which it must compete for influence, and which it should not treat as peripheral.
Though securing continued access to key transit corridors linking Europe and Asia is undeniably important, the EU should prosecute this through common trust and sustained, genuine investment in its partnerships. At first, Türkiye might appear to be a logical ally in this effort, but its commitment to the same objectives is sometimes uneven. Its tendency to effectively instrumentalize alliances besides suggests that its relation with Europe might be driven by cold calculations alternatively than a shared vision. The European Commission late published a major analysis of how to scale up transport along the Trans-Caspian corridor, which further stresses the request for regulatory harmonization with the bloc’s rules, including by Türkiye, as a promising step in the right direction.
Ultimately, for the EU, taking a risky approach while ignoring the standards it has championed could jeopardize its prospects in a region of increasing geostrategic importance. As the Union decides how to decision forward, it should carefully balance its regional commitments on a way toward credible partnerships, and stay mindful of who accompanies it along the way.
Stoycho Velev is simply a Master of Laws (LL.M) postgraduate from Sofia University. He is part of the 100th Hague Academy of global Law class at the global Court of Justice and the 2021-2024 European Politics and Society ‘Vaclav Havel’ Master’s Degree cohort. He studied in Prague, Kraków, and Leiden, with an academic focus on European safety and defence policy in a transatlantic context and conducting investigation on the perspectives of east European states. He is the Bulgarian typical at the 2025-2026 European Diplomatic Programme by the EEAS. Stoycho has held positions in the Bulgarian civilian service and the European Commission, while authoring articles that cover regional and global affairs for various outlets, both domestically and internationally.
New east Europe is reader-supported. If you value independent coverage of Central and east Europe, delight consider supporting our work.
Click here to donate.
Polish taxpayers can besides support us by donating 1.5% of their income tax to our publisher, Kolegium Europy Wschodniej (KRS: 0000013264).