Since the russian era, the Russian Orthodox Church has played a very circumstantial function within the Russian state. It has yet functioned as an instrument of its safety services and primarily the KGB.
Church structures were famously utilized to gather information on dissent, foster loyalty to the authorities, and disseminate the Communist Party’s ideological narratives.
In modern Russia, this approach has persisted but adapted to the Kremlin’s fresh geopolitical objectives. Now we see the Russian Orthodox Church acting as 1 of the Kremlin’s most covert channels of influence. This is peculiarly clear beyond the country’s borders – in Europe, the US and Latin America – where it maintains a network of spiritual and cultural hubs.
We increasingly see this state-linked institution being utilized to deploy pro-Kremlin narratives, form a favourable information environment, and influence Russian-speaking communities. The spiritual origin organically complements political, media and intelligence tools, becoming part of the Russian Federation’s broader strategy of hybrid influence – peculiarly in Europe.
Among the Russian Orthodox Church’s most crucial media assets is the tv channel SPAS. Since its launch in 2005, it has served as a major platform for promoting narratives of Russia’s “holy struggle”, “Orthodox values”, and the legitimization of military aggression as a divinely sanctioned mission.
Patriarch Kirill – who is sanctioned by respective European governments for supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine – and another elder Russian spiritual leaders systematically combine ecclesiastical and military symbolism. They urge the faithful to support the Russian army, to make “sacrifices” for the state, and to view participation in war as a religiously sanctioned act.
The Russian Orthodox Church promotes the concepts of “Holy Rus” and the “Russian World”, portraying Crimea and the occupied territories as “sacred Russian land” and depicting Ukrainian opposition as a betrayal of Orthodoxy.
These narratives supply a pseudo-religious justification for Russia’s aggression while helping to legitimize the business of Ukrainian territory in the eyes of home audiences. Ukraine has served as the primary investigating ground for these methods of religiously framed information warfare.
The methods tested against Ukraine are being utilized with expanding frequency on the European continent. In Europe, the Russian Orthodox Church is becoming an instrument of hybrid influence that extends far beyond its conventional spiritual function.
European safety services have long documented links between Russian Orthodox structures and influence operations, including intelligence activities. In fresh years, concerns regarding cooperation between representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and the safety services have only intensified.
In December 2023, the Swedish safety Service confirmed that representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church had cooperated with Russian intelligence services and that Church structures had been utilized for espionage with direct state funding. Authorities have besides expressed concern over the construction of a Russian Orthodox church in Västerås close strategic infrastructure, where the church’s consecration was attended by diplomats later suspected of espionage.
That same year, Bulgarian authorities expelled the head of the Russian Orthodox Church’s mission in Sofia and 2 another clergymen on the grounds that they posed a threat to national security.
Estonian intelligence has warned that the local Orthodox Church remains under Russian influence despite authoritative organizational changes and that any of its leaders proceed to publically justify Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Estonia besides expelled Metropolitan Eugene, the head of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, following a national safety assessment. The agency has further described Russian Orthodox structures abroad as a long-established cover for Russian intelligence operations. In Norway, security experts drew attention to the Russian Orthodox Church’s acquisition of property close military bases and critical infrastructure sites, raising concerns that Church infrastructure could service as cover for intelligence activities.
Similarly, Latvia adopted government in 2022 requiring the Latvian Orthodox Church to sever its canonical ties with the Moscow Patriarchate, reflecting increasing concerns over the Kremlin’s usage of spiritual institutions as channels of influence. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, respective Orthodox parishes have distanced themselves from the Moscow Patriarchate following Patriarch Kirill’s endorsement of Russia’s invasion. This decision illustrates increasing opposition to the Kremlin’s influence within European Orthodox communities.
These cases of course show an indication that European governments are increasingly viewing certain networks of the Russian Orthodox Church through the prism national security. However, there is inactive work that must be done.
The Church has acted as a “spiritual façade” for the war. Since the start of the full-scale invasion, it has become even more profoundly integrated into Russia’s war effort.
Special military units and military-patriotic associations have been established across the country. At the same time, Russian priests service alongside combat units, consecrate weapons and military equipment, and organize fundraising and aid for the armed forces. In the occupied territories, alleged “military churches” are present, while Ukrainian clergy have been replaced by Russian spiritual figures.
The Russian Orthodox Church forum held in Moscow in January 2026 effectively instructed Russian clergy to “sell the war” to their parishioners by incorporating justifications for the aggression into their sermons and everyday spiritual practice. This is peculiarly sinister given the prevalent networks that the Church has established in Europe.
These actions are systematic in nature and form part of Kremlin policy, alternatively than being isolated incidents.
This undoubtedly creates additional risks to the interior stableness of European societies. It exacerbates polarization in peculiar through the exploitation of issues of religion and identity for political ends.
A key challenge for Europe evidently remains distinguishing between legitimate spiritual activity and the usage of Church structures as hostile instruments of influence. In the long term, it is precisely this balance between safety and spiritual freedom that will be the key test of European democracies’ resilience to the Kremlin’s covert influence abroad.
Zarmina Zarifi is Head of the Monitoring Department at the Ukrainian safety and Cooperation Center (USCC). She specializes in media monitoring and analysis with a focus on spiritual processes, spiritual propaganda, and hybrid warfare.
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