Old problems and modern solutions: technology and the conflict for election integrity in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The night of the snap presidential election in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska was a triumphant 1 for the SNSD candidate, Siniša Karan. This was even more so for the organization leader Milorad Dodik. But for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and its already fragile democracy, it was far little so. The elections followed a series of unprecedented legal developments: the Constitutional Court of BiH struck down respective laws adopted in Republika Srpska (RS), while the State Court convicted Milorad Dodik for refusing to implement the decisions of the advanced typical (HR), the head of the global body overseeing the peace agreement. The ruling jeopardized Dodik’s ability to proceed serving as RS’s president, and a six-year ban from public office was imposed, prompting the Central Election Commission (CIK) to revoke his mandate.

Karan’s narrow victory, with 50.4 per cent of the vote, was rapidly labelled “fraud” and “manipulation” by opposition parties. Transparency global reported statistically impossible turnout spikes in certain precincts; pre-filled ballots and altered tally sheets; systematic additions of votes for non-voters; and ballots cast in the names of deceased individuals. All of this has deepened citizens’ mistrust and reinforced the perception of illegitimacy – not only of the electoral strategy but besides of public institutions and political representatives.

Technology as a long-promised solution

Over the past decade, electoral irregularities have created serious distrust towards the very mechanisms that sustain democratic life. Electoral improvement has long been 1 of the most contested political topics in BiH. Over 70 per cent of citizens uncertainty the fairness and regularity of BiH’s elections, and most believe that introducing fresh technologies would improve transparency. 1 of the long-promised solutions has been the introduction of fresh technologies – reforms that could modernize the electoral process, velocity up counting, and enhance transparency. NGOs, the Office of the advanced typical (OHR, the global overseer of the peace agreement framework), but besides any political parties, have pushed for specified measures, prompting the HR Christian Schmidt to impose them in his fresh legal interventions. Yet, budget blockades, organization resistance, and limited organization capacity proceed to undermine the implementation and backing of these reforms, raising deeper questions about the willingness of political elites to implement specified changes at all.

Electoral improvement and the Bonn powers

Demographic changes and shifting power dynamics have intensified debates about the structure of the representation for the country’s 3 “constituent peoples” (Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats), as well as its number groups. While public debate about elections frequently centres on how the election law should structure these cultural representations, irregularities in election administration have been a persistent problem for decades. Those liable for fraud besides rarely face charges or lose office.

For example, in 2020, elections had to be repeated in Doboj and Srebrenica due to fabricated votes, ballots cast in the names of deceased individuals, and organized “carousel voting” by persons brought from abroad on election day. In the 2022 presidential elections in RS, a recount was required after the opposition accused the governing SNSD of widespread manipulation.

At the same time, many called on the OHR to intervene more decisively in the field of electoral legislation, utilizing the alleged “Bonn Powers”, which give this institution peculiar authority to intervene in home governance. It did so twice late on this matter, in 2024 and again in 2025.

First steps toward improvement – due to OHR intervention

On March 26th 2024, the HR imposed the Decision Enacting the Law on Amendments to the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Contrary to expectations, these were mostly method changes alternatively than structural, ethnic-based reforms, leaving any political leaders disappointed. Among another things, the amendments restrict the participation of individuals convicted of war crimes, strengthen sex equality provisions, and introduce transparency measures.

Importantly, the Decision, for the first time, formally introduces the concept of “election technologies”. Article 1.28 (Definitions) provides that:

“Election technologies shall include a set of information and communication programmes, information and communication devices, methods and procedures and another method equipment utilized in the election process (…)”

This decision explicitly opened the door to electronic voter identification, video surveillance at polling stations, and electronic counting of ballots.

Lesson from abroad

Bosnia and Herzegovina is not entering unknown waters. According to the OSCE, nearly all modern electoral administrations usage any form of fresh technologies, from electronic voter lists and results management tools to digital counting and transmission systems. 15 out of twenty-seven EU associate states already usage the same election technologies as proposed in BiH. Estonia remains the most advanced European example, offering nationwide online voting that trust on electronic voter registers and digital systems for reporting and aggregating results. another states, specified as Ireland and the Netherlands, usage technology only for results management after discontinuing earlier voting-machine pilots. Together, these examples show that technology is already a part of most European electoral systems, even if paper ballots stay the primary voting method.

The Council of Europe and the European Commission both emphasize that specified tools can strengthen election integrity if introduced gradually and with safeguards ensuring transparency, verifiability, and cybersecurity.

Yet any states besides stay cautious. Germany, for example, discontinued electronic voting machines after a Constitutional Court decision stressed the request for full public and verifiable counting, a concern rooted not necessarily in fraud but alternatively in the aim to make elections full accessible to all citizens.

Although most election technologies present stay simple and hardware-based, respective countries, including India and the US, already usage small-scale AI tools for tasks specified as voter-roll management or voter information. These trends propose that AI governance in elections might become increasingly applicable globally, going beyond discussions about the usage of simple technology in elections.

Opposition to (election) technology in BiH politics

Despite the March 2024 decision’s promise of fairer elections through fresh technologies, not all political leaders in BiH welcomed the changes. erstwhile the Parliamentary Assembly failed to adopt the state budget for 2025, the OHR intervened again. On July 17th 2025, the HR enacted the Law on Amendments to the Law on Financing of the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, yet providing funds for the planned introduction of election technologies for the local elections scheduled for October 2026. The act notes that this backing is “essential for strengthening election integrity and transparency in line with global democratic standards”.

Despite this, implementation inactive remains uncertain. Political actors proceed to block the reforms and defy the usage of fresh technologies. Fact-checking organizations have already debunked conspiracy theories and false information coming from politicians claiming that specified technologies are “unproven” or “not utilized elsewhere”, revealing a clear political disinterest in improving electoral integrity.

The reluctance is part of a broader pattern. According to the OECD Reports, BiH lacks a national AI strategy; operates without comprehensive e-government strategies at any level of government; and has virtually non-existent institutionalized online participation tools. Therefore, even beyond elections, the connection between democratic innovation and public governance in BiH remains minimal.

Beyond technology: a test of political will?

Technological tools alone will not save BiH’s electoral strategy and democracy. However, they represent an essential starting point, a demonstration that political elites are willing to implement basic reforms to make elections more transparent. They would besides show a genuine commitment to restoring public trust in the process.

The ongoing political obstruction, combined with disinformation and conspiracy theories surrounding election technology, exposes a deeper unwillingness to guarantee fair elections. This not only delays BiH’s EU integration way but continues to force the OHR to intervene in core democratic processes – tasks that should mostly remainder with home institutions.

Transparent and verifiable usage of technology can make democratic accountability tangible, allowing citizens to see that their votes are stored safely and counted fairly. Unless political elites halt blocking implementation, BiH will stay trapped with elections that satisfy neither global standards nor citizens’ expectations, further eroding trust in public institutions and democratic processes. fresh technologies offer a chance to break this cycle. Whether they will be introduced or stay another unrealized improvement depends on decisions made long before the next ballots are cast.

Electoral technology is only 1 of many technological areas where BiH lags behind. Yet, if implemented properly, it could become a catalyst for broader democratic innovation, closer cooperation between technology and governance, and increased social trust in its complex political system.

Suljo Ćorsulić is a PhD investigator at the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IOS) and University of Duisburg-Essen. His doctoral investigation focuses on technology policy in the Western Balkans and Southeast Europe, examining how fresh and emerging technologies form trust and perceptions of legitimacy in democratisation and EU integration processes in the region. He holds an MA in South European Studies from the University of Glasgow and has worked in civilian society and investigation projects on disinformation, EU integration, and technology policy.