The start and course of the Russo-Ukrainian War since 2014 have been principally shaped by the fact that Russia has, and Ukraine does not have, weapons of mass destruction. Oddly, this war-enabling situation is legitimized, codified and preserved by 1 of the politically most crucial and, with 191 signatory states, most comprehensive multilateral agreements of modern global law. The 1968 atomic Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows Russia, as an authoritative nuclear-weapon state, to build and get atomic warheads. At the same time, the NPT explicitly forbids Ukraine, as an authoritative non-nuclear-weapon state, to do the same. Ukraine’s non-nuclear allies – from Canada in the West to Japan in East – are likewise bound by the NPT, as well as conventions on chemical and biological weapons, to their statuses as purely conventional military powers.
In its second article, the NPT postulates for all but 5 of its 191 signatory states, including Ukraine, that “[e]ach non-nuclear-weapon State organization to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of atomic weapons or another atomic explosive devices or of control over specified weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise get atomic weapons or another atomic explosive devices; and not to search or receive any assistance in the manufacture of atomic weapons or another atomic explosive devices.” The NPT thus prevented both Ukraine’s deterrence of, and defence against, the authoritative nuclear-weapon state of Russia.
The 1994 Budapest Memorandum as an NPT appendix
Even more oddly, the emerging post-Soviet Ukrainian state possessed, in the early 1990s, the world’s 3rd largest arsenal of atomic warheads – an inheritance from the russian Union which broke up from August to December 1991. Immediately after Ukraine’s acquisition of independence, the number of its atomic arms was, for a brief period, larger than that of China, France and the United Kingdom’s weapons of mass demolition put together. Most Ukrainian and many abroad observers now admit that it was naïve of Kyiv to get rid, in the mid-1990s, not only of most, but of all its atomic material, technology and transportation systems. At least, it was unwise to not request in exchange a reliable protection mechanics like NATO membership or a common aid pact with the United States. Worse, many Ukrainian warheads, missiles, bombers, etc. were not destroyed in Ukraine, but transferred to – of all countries – Russia.
Instead of an alliance that could defend it, Kyiv received, in exchange for its voluntary atomic disarmament, a written safety warrant from Moscow promising, in the now infamous Budapest Memorandum, to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and integrity. At the last summit of the Conference for safety and Cooperation in Europe, before it transformed into the OSCE, in Hungary’s capital in December 1994, the Russian Federation (RF), United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) signed with Ukraine the fateful The short paper duplicated 2 akin memoranda which were especially designed for the post-Soviet holders of parts of the erstwhile USSR’s atomic arsenal – Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Being the alleged “depositary governments” of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Moscow, Washington and London became in 1994 and are inactive present the guarantors of the borders of these 3 erstwhile Russian colonies and russian republics.
In their 3 Budapest Memoranda, the NPT’s depositary states assured Kyiv, Minsk and Almaty/Astana that they would neither force nor attack the 3 post-Soviet countries. That promise was given by the US, UK and RF in exchange for the agreement of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to get free of all their military atomic capabilities, and to enter the non-proliferation government as decently non-nuclear-weapon states. China and France, as the another 2 authoritative nuclear-weapon states under the NPT, issued separate governmental declarations besides assuring Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan of respect for their borders. Recently, this communicative has been masterfully detailed by Harvard’s atomic historian Mariana Budjeryn in her award-winning book Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the atomic Disarmament of Ukraine (Johns Hopkins University Press 2022).
Security assurances or guarantees?
To be sure, the English-language titles of the 3 Budapest Memoranda talk only of “security assurances” from the NPT’s depositary governments for Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. This linguistic item is sometimes taken to mean that the promises given by Washington, Moscow and London to Kyiv, Minsk and Almaty/Astana in 1994 were only semi-obligatory. Thus, the communicative goes, Russia’s manifest breach of its twenty-year old deal with Ukraine, erstwhile the Russian Federation annexed Crimea in 2014 along with many akin actions, is supposedly only a insignificant violation of any by now dated assurances and of the logic of the non-proliferation regime.
Yet, the Memoranda’s authoritative translations that are most applicable present – namely, the Russian- and Ukrainian-language versions of the paper – are markedly different from the English original. The Budapest Memorandum’s Russian and Ukrainian headings talk of “guarantees of security”. In Russian this is “o garantiiakh bezopasnosti” and in Ukrainian “pro harantii bezpeky”. The Russian and Ukrainian translations of the phrase “on safety assurances” in the English version of the Budapest Memorandum, i.e. “o zavereniiakh bezopasnosti” or “pro zavirennia bezpeky”, do not appear in the titles of the Memorandum’s Russian and Ukrainian versions.
Washington and London thus indeed only “assured”, in Ukraine’s English-language version of the Budapest Memorandum, that they would not force or attack the post-Soviet country. In contrast, Moscow “guaranteed” Kyiv, in the document’s Russian and Ukrainian-language versions, the territorial integrity and independency of Ukraine. The Russian word for guarantees, in the prepositional case, reads “garantiiakh” while the Ukrainian word for guarantees, in the accusative case, reads “harantii”. If written in Cyrillic letters, these 2 words look sufficiently akin to assert that Moscow full understood, in December 1994, that it was giving Kyiv guarantees alternatively than specified assurances of security.
Russian NPT subversion before the war
Russia started violating the Budapest Memorandum and the NPT’s logic already before the beginning of its war against Ukraine and business of Crimea in February 2014. For instance, Russia tried to infringe upon Ukraine’s state territory and border in 2003 with a unilateral and yet abortive infrastructure task approaching the Ukrainian island of Tuzla in the Kerch Straits of the Black Sea. 10 years later, Moscow attempted to prevent Kyiv’s upcoming conclusion of an already initialed Association Agreement with the European Union. Throughout 2013, it exerted dense economical as well as political force on Kyiv – a kind of behaviour explicitly forbidden by the Budapest Memorandum’s 3rd article.
It may besides be worth reminding that Russia began already in the mid-1990s, long before Putin’s star in Russian politics started rising, to manifestly violate the logic of the non-proliferation government in the post-Soviet space. Moscow did so with respect to another European successor state of the USSR, the Republic of Moldova, which did not receive a Budapest Memorandum but, like Ukraine, acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in 1994. In that year, Chisinau besides signed an agreement with Moscow on the withdrawal of Russian troops from, and on the dissolution of, the Moscow-supported unrecognized “Transnistrian-Moldovan Republic” in east Moldova. 30 years later, neither of these obligations of the nuclear-weapon-state Russia vis-à-vis the non-nuclear-weapon state Moldova has been fulfilled.
A akin communicative has, since the late 2000s, been ongoing in Georgia, which had besides acceded, in 1994, to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. At the end of the five-day Russo-Georgian War of August 2008, Russia signed with Georgia a ceasefire agreement. The alleged “Sarkozy Plan” obliged Moscow to retreat its troops from Georgia. Yet, Russia left, in violation of its 2008 promise, a large part of its regular forces on Georgian state territory. Moreover, Moscow recognized 2 separatist regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” (i.e. Georgia’s Tskhinvali Region), as independent states – in apparent contradiction to the logic of the non-proliferation government in which Russia and Georgia both officially participate.
To be sure, the continuing infringement of the territorial integrity of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine is primarily determined by Russia’s larger conventional, alternatively than its advanced nuclear, military power. Yet, Moscow’s possession of atomic arms, as well as Chisinau, Tbilisi and Kyiv’s non-possession of WMDs, has been an crucial background origin in the Kremlin’s expansive behaviour for 30 years now. Without its large atomic military capacity, Russia would have had to be far more cautious with its permanent deployment of conventional forces in countries where its troops are not wanted.
Moreover, Moscow’s aggressive actions were – contrary to the Kremlin’s loud claims – only partially related to Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine’s global or/and interior affairs. Russian troops are stationed illegally on the territories of, on the 1 side, the authoritative NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine as well as, on the another side, the officially neutral Republic of Moldova. The second can, according to its inactive valid Constitution of 1994, neither enter NATO nor let abroad troops on its land. The Russian occupations of Transnistria, Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” have continued independently of the geopolitical stance of Moldova and Georgia’s governments in the past or today. Whether the leaderships in Chisinau and Tbilisi have been communist or nationalist, and whether they have been friendly or adversarial towards Moscow, has had small effect on Russia’s illegal business of authoritative Moldovan and Georgian state territory. That was and is in spite of these territories being covered by the NPT and many another security-related treaties to which Russia, Georgia and Moldova are parties.
A akin communicative goes for Russia’s behaviour towards Ukraine. Many observers forget present that Moscow intensified its non-kinetic “hybrid” warfare against the Ukrainian state already before 2014 and started the military capture of Crimea as early as February 20th, 2014. During these periods of time, the Ukrainian state was headed by the loudly pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovych. The Moscow-friendly president of Ukraine was inactive in full power erstwhile Russia was exerting, throughout 2013, dense economical as well as political force on Ukraine to not sign an Association Agreement with the EU. This was in spite of Moscow’s, as well as Washington and London’s, work in the Budapest Memorandum to “[r]efrain from economical coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to safe advantages of any kind”. Yanukovych was besides inactive in office erstwhile Russia began, in February 2014, illegally occupying Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula – an action besides forbidden by the Budapest Memorandum. Yanukovych left his presidential office, the city of Kyiv and yet Ukraine for Russia only after Russian regular troops without insignia had started conquering south Ukrainian state territory by force.
How Moscow put the NPT on its head
Since February 2014, Russia has not only always more ruthlessly attacked Ukraine by military and non-military means with regular and irregular forces. Moscow has been besides violating always more unashamedly and demonstratively the safety guarantees it gave to Kyiv in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Moscow’s actions have thereby been increasingly contradicting and even reversing the logic of the non-proliferation government in place since 1970.
The NPT is today, together with akin conventions on biological and chemical weapons, a central part of the post-1945 UN-based global safety system. Apart from its written regulations, the NPT’s implicit function is that of upholding the borders of non-nuclear weapon states – especially so vis-à-vis the 5 officially nuclear-weapon states. In its introduction, the NPT is “[r]ecalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, [those] States [that have signed or acceded to the treaty] must refrain in their global relations from the threat or usage of force against the territorial integrity or political independency of any State, or in any another manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations […].” Circumscribing temporary possession of atomic arms to 5 countries that besides happen to be permanent members of the UN safety Council (“the P5”), the NPT is tasked with reducing the hazard of inter-state war in general, and the usage of atomic weapons as instruments of expansionist abroad political affairs in particular.
As the legal successor to the USSR, a founder and depositary state of the NPT, and the explicit guarantor of the inviolability of Ukraine’s borders in the Budapest Memorandum, Russia has now put the intent of the non-proliferation government on its head. The NPT’s exception for the Russian possession of atomic weapons has helped Moscow to conduct its expansionist and genocidal war against Ukraine. The NPT’s prohibition of the Ukrainian possession of atomic weapons has besides prevented Kyiv’s effective deterrence and defence against the Russian onslaught since 2014.
The NPT enabled Moscow to endanger not only Ukraine but besides its allies – especially the non-nuclear ones – with atomic annihilation and atomic winter. This is especially actual if they proceed to assist the Ukrainian opposition against Russia’s unashamed territorial enlargement and continued panic against civilians. The NPT’s authorization of the Russian possession of atomic weapons has had, in the past, and will have, in the foreseeable future, the effect of inhibiting military support for Ukraine from global law-abiding countries. This inhibition concerns both the provision to Ukraine with, and the approval to use, certain peculiarly effective conventional military technologies, specified as Germany’s Taurus cruise missiles. It has besides stopped the deployment of allied troops on Ukrainian territory, whether they are sent by NATO, the EU or an ad hoc coalition of Ukraine-friendly nation-states.
If Kyiv had, in 2014, owned atomic weapons, Russia would most most likely not have attacked Ukraine and thereby risked an erasure, by a Ukrainian atomic response, of full Russian cities – as happened to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. If Moscow had, on the another hand, not possessed atomic weapons in 2014, Ukraine’s western allies would most most likely have come rapidly to Kyiv’s help. A coalition of the willing would likely have liberated, in 2014-15, the illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula and occupied parts of the Donbas in the same way in which a US-led coalition, in 1991, liberated Kuwait that had been occupied and annexed by Iraq the year before. The rules established by the NPT have thus facilitated both the start of Russia’s territorial expansion and genocidal war in 2014, and the subsequent unwillingness of the global community to resolutely reverse Moscow’s first land capture, prevent Russia’s further expansion, and forestall the ongoing genocide in Ukraine.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
The atomic non-proliferation government went into force in 1970. It has since drawn its legitimacy from being an encompassing agreement that helps to limit the emergence and escalation of wars, as well as prevent the usage of atomic weapons for expansionist aims. Yet, it is present generating alternatively different effects in connection with Russia’s annihilation war on, and capture of land from, the NPT signatory state Ukraine. Since 2023, these corrosive effects have been further aggravated by the increasingly direct engagement of North Korea, as a nuclear-weapon state outside the NPT and a non-signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Being forbidden by the NPT to have atomic arms, Ukraine is now being attacked by 2 countries that – more or less, legally – have atomic weapons.
Moreover, Russia is assisted in its subversion of the non-proliferation regime, in 1 way or another, by additional signatory states of the NPT. The authoritative nuclear-weapon state China and the – at least, for now – non-nuclear weapon state Iran are actively helping Russia in its war efforts via the provision of military, dual-use, or/and non-military help. China manifestly contradicts, with its support for Russia’s war, its “Statement of the Chinese Government on the safety assurance to Ukraine issued on 4 December 1994”. In this historical paper deposited with the UN General Assembly, Beijing had assured Kyiv, in connection with Ukraine’s decision to become a non-nuclear-weapon state under the NPT and the signing of the Budapest Memorandum, that China “fully understands the desire of Ukraine for safety assurance. […] The Chinese government has constantly opposed the practice of exerting political, economic, or another force in global relations. It maintains that disputes and differences should be settled peacefully through consultations on an equal footing. […] China recognizes and respects the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine.”
Belarus has signed its own Budapest Memorandum with the US, UK and Russian Federation in 1994. Nevertheless, Belarus allows Russia present to station and operate not only conventional troops but besides atomic weapons on its territory. Minsk thereby and in many another ways assists Moscow in its attack on Ukraine. The country besides contributes to undermining the ideas behind the NPT and the Budapest Memoranda.
Being, like North Korea, a nuclear-weapon state outside the NPT, India rhetorically supports Ukraine, unlike North Korea. Yet, India has become a major trading partner of Russia since 2022. fresh Delhi thus besides indirectly contributes to the corrosion of global trust in the logic of non-proliferation.
Obviously, the functioning and future of the NPT are closely linked to the course, results and repercussions of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Considering the clear relevance for humankind of a continuation of the non-proliferation regime, the following six policies can be recommended to actors curious in its defence:
- All signatory states of the NPT afraid about its preservation should supply the non-nuclear weapon state Ukraine with, as much as they can, military and non-military support, enabling Kyiv to accomplish a convincing triumph on the battlefield and the liberation of its territories presently illegally occupied by Russia.
- All signatory states of the NPT afraid about its preservation should request from Moscow an immediate end to its threats of a atomic escalation, as well as inform Russia and its allies that specified an escalation would trigger a resolute military and non-military counter-reaction from them.
- All signatory states of the NPT afraid about its preservation should effectively sanction and publically condemn the nuclear-weapon states Russia and North Korea as long as they proceed waging an expansionist war on the territory of the non-nuclear-weapon state Ukraine. The same mechanics should apply with respect to Russia’s continued business of parts of the non-nuclear-weapon states Moldova and Georgia.
- All signatory states of the NPT afraid about its preservation should insist on a just peace for Ukraine, including the full restoration of its territorial integrity; full preservation of national sovereignty; full return of all prisoners of war and deported civilians including children; and full compensation for Ukraine’s demolition via Russian reparations.
- All non-governmental organizations, businesses and individuals favouring a continuation of the non-proliferation government should support, with whatever means they have, Ukraine’s triumph and recovery, as well as publically argue and sanction Russia and North Korea with all the instruments available to them.
- Washington and London have, as depositary governments of the 1968 NPT and as signatories of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, peculiar responsibilities vis-à-vis Kyiv. The United States and United Kingdom should so offer Ukraine a transformation of their 30-year-old safety assurances into a common aid pact. A tripartite, fully-fledged military alliance would defend Ukraine until it becomes a associate of NATO, and besides let the global utilization of expanding Ukrainian war-related know-how and resources. All another signatory states of the NPT should be invited to join this trilateral defence treaty and to thereby contribute to upholding the logic of the non-proliferation regime.
A shorter version of this article was published by “The National Interest,” in December 2024.
Dr. Andreas Umland is an analyst at the Stockholm Center for east European Studies (SCEEUS) of the Swedish Institute of global Affairs (UI).
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