From NATO Partnership for Peace crisis to European Peace Facility delays: Orbán’s impact on Armenia

Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat marks a crucial political improvement not only for Hungary, the European Union, and support for Ukraine, but besides for Armenia. After all, it may have implications for EU cohesion, decision-making dynamics, and the Union’s external engagement in regions specified as the South Caucasus. Armenia has been straight affected by a series of decisions taken by the government of Viktor Orbán between 2012 and 2025.

A defining episode: the 2012 extradition

The roots of this trajectory go back to August 2012, erstwhile the Hungarian government authorized the extradition to Azerbaijan of Ramil Safarov, a convicted Azerbaijani military officer who had killed the Armenian officer Gurgen Margaryan with an axe while he slept during a NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) English-language training course in Budapest in 2004. He had besides intended to attack a second Armenian officer but was prevented by safety personnel. The execution itself had caused a crucial sense of crisis within the NATO Partnership for Peace framework, raising concerns about trust, security, and the viability of cooperative engagement between its members. This incidental yet contributed to the eventual cancellation of a planned NATO PfP military exercise in Baku in September 2024.

Upon his return to Azerbaijan, Safarov was pardoned by president Ilham Aliyev. The officer was promoted in rank, awarded, and publically honoured. This drew strong global criticism, including condemnation by US president Barack Obama. In response, Armenia suspended diplomatic relations with Hungary in 2012, which remained frozen for a decade.

The extradition was accompanied by allegations of financial incentives. Investigative reporting pointed to transfers exceeding 7 million US dollars to a Hungarian bank account linked to an offshore company associated with Azerbaijani elites around the same period. This besides coincided with Viktor Orbán’s visit to Baku and the decisions that shaped the extradition process. In addition, broader arrangements were reported, frequently referring to 2 to 3 billion euros in Azerbaijani investments or purchases of Hungarian government bonds.

Post-2022 normalization without policy shift

Diplomatic relations between Armenia and Hungary were restored in December 2022. However, the subsequent positions of the government led by Viktor Orbán continued to align with Azerbaijan, with applicable implications for Yerevan. Within the Council of the European Union, Hungary and Italy reportedly prevented consensus on adopting a strong collective condemnation of Azerbaijan’s September 2023 military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. As a result, a message was issued alternatively by the EU advanced typical for abroad Affairs and safety Policy Josep Borrell.

Symbolic signalling and cultural heritage

In July 2024, Viktor Orbán visited Shusha (Armenian version – Shushi) to participate in an informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States hosted by Ilham Aliyev. The town, located in the erstwhile area of Nagorno-Karabakh, had come under Azerbaijani control following the 2020 war and has since been utilized as a venue for global events. The choice of the town as the venue conveyed clear political signalling in the aftermath of the conflict.

Despite the Hungarian government’s self-positioning as a defender of Christian heritage, it did not publically address the condition of Armenian spiritual and cultural heritage in the area. This is peculiarly crucial given documented cases of the alteration and distortion of Armenian heritage. This includes the Surb Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in the centre of the town, as well as harm and appropriation to sites in another parts of Karabakh.

Delays in EU support to Armenia

Hungary played a sustained function in trying to prevent and delaying EU assistance to Armenia under the European Peace Facility, an instrument designed to support partners’ safety and defence capacities through non-lethal means. Both the first (ten million euro) and second (20 million euro) assistance measures for Armenia were blocked by Hungary for extended periods – about 1.5 years each – before their eventual approval. These delays were not procedural but political, reflecting Hungary’s positioning within EU decision-making processes.

The prolonged blockage occurred at a time erstwhile Armenia was seeking to strengthen its resilience and defence capacity following repeated safety challenges, including escalations along its internationally recognized borders. The delays so had applicable implications, postponing the transportation of EU-supported capabilities and limiting the timeliness of the EU’s response.

Implications for Armenia’s upcoming elections

These dynamics besides intersect with Armenia’s home political context ahead of the forthcoming elections on June 7th. Orbán has frequently been perceived as being aligned with Russia and, by extension, associated in Armenian political discourse with external influence narratives linked to Moscow. This perception is reinforced by Moscow’s support for pro-Russian opposition forces in Armenia working against Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

At the same time, Armenia’s parliament adopted an EU integration bill in spring 2025. This was cautiously framed as a long-term aspiration toward membership in the European Union – an agenda explicitly opposed by Russia. However, the opposition besides claims that US Vice president J.D. Vance has expressed support for Pashinyan during his February 2026 visit to Armenia, as he previously did for Orbán. This adds further complexity to the explanation of external signals.

Supporters of both the ruling organization and the opposition interpret these signals through their respective political narratives. For the ruling side, Orbán’s defeat is framed as a setback for Russia and, by extension, Vladimir Putin, while for the opposition it is seen as a setback for J.D. Vance. In spite of these different interpretations, Orbán is widely perceived in Armenian public discourse as the leader liable for extraditing the convicted killer of the army officer.

Outlook: beginning space for Armenia–Hungary engagement

In the short term, these dynamics may influence the framing of the electoral run itself. Competing interpretations of external developments – whether linked to Russia, the European Union, or the United States – are likely to be mobilized by both sides to reenforce existing narratives about Armenia’s strategical orientation and external partnerships.

Taken together, these developments illustrate how Armenia–EU relations have been shaped not only by bilateral engagement but besides by interior EU dynamics. The EU’s ability to act as a coherent abroad policy actor depends on consensus among its associate states, and erstwhile that consensus is constrained, the effects extend straight to Armenia.

Overall, these developments reflect a set of policies that have had applicable implications for Armenia. While it is besides early to measure future directions, the political transition in Hungary may supply an chance to open a fresh page in Armenia–Hungary relations and research more constructive engagement within the EU framework.

Sossi Tatikyan holds a Master of Public Administration degree from the Harvard Kennedy School, has been a NATO defence College Partnership for Peace investigation Fellow, and is presently a PhD investigator at Sorbonne Nouvelle University. She is the co-founder and manager of the Yerevan Center of abroad and safety Policy established in 2025. Previously she has been a diplomat for Armenia and UN safety Sector improvement and Political Officer in respective peace operations. Her main investigation topics are cultural conflicts, cognitive and information warfare and lawfare, Euro-Atlantic integration, and the safety dilemmas and policies of tiny states.

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